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Abstract
This paper empirically investigates the cause of asymmetric pricing: retail prices responding
faster to cost increases than decreases. Using daily price data for over 11,000 retail gasoline
stations I find that prices fall slower than they rise as a consequence of firms extracting
informational rents from consumers with positive search costs. Premium gasoline prices are
shown to fall slower than regular fuel prices but rise at the same pace, and this pricing pattern
supports theories based upon competition with consumer search. Further testing also rejects
focal price collusion as an important determinant of asymmetric pricing.
1 Introduction
A burgeoning body of economic literature has focused on the retail gasoline industry. The increased
attention stems from the market being substantially influenced by factors rigorously studied by
microeconomic theorists: search costs, spatial differentiation, tacit collusion, and Edgeworth cycles
to name a few. The primary line of investigation in this paper will center around the issue of
asymmetric pricing: the tendency for firms to adjust retail prices in greater magnitude in response
to cost increases than cost decreases.
Using data from the UK retail gasoline market, Bacon (1991) was the first to document that
firms respond more quickly to cost increases than decreases, while also coining the phrase “rockets
and feathers” to describe the phenomenon. Supporting the hypothesis that gasoline prices shoot up
∗I am grateful to Joe Harrington for advice throughout this project. I also thank Mitsukuni Nishida, Stephen
Shore, and participants of the Johns Hopkins Applied Micro seminar for advice. All remaining errors are my
own. Address: Marc Remer, JHU Department of Economics, 3400 N. Charles St., Baltimore, MD 21218. Email:
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like rockets but fall like feathers are the findings of Borenstein, Cameron, and Gilbert1 (1997), whose
empirical model has served as the foundation for identifying asymmetric price adjustments. Building
on the work of BCG, a substantial body of literature has identified rockets and feathers in retail
gasoline markets in Canada, the United States, Chile, and a host of European countries. Asymmetric
pricing, however, is not confined to the retail gasoline industry; Peltzman (2000) examines 242
diverse product markets and confirms rockets and feathers to be a common pricing phenomenon
in more than two thirds of the markets. The study finds, on average, the immediate retail price
response to a positive cost shock to be twice the size of the response to a negative cost change, and
the difference in magnitude can persist for months following the initial cost shock.
These empirical findings, until recently, were unexplained by economic theory, and even now
there exists a lack of consensus as to asymmetric pricing’s underlying cause. One of the first
explanations to gain traction was that it was a precipitant of a type of focal price collusion;2 firms
coordinate on the previous period’s price until demand or wholesale cost conditions impel a change.
When costs drop firms hold retail prices constant so as to increase profit margins, but they raise
prices in response to a cost increase to maintain a positive margin and/or not be viewed as cheating
on the collusive agreement. Thus, retail prices respond faster to cost increases than decreases. While
this variant of focal price collusion offers a convenient framework within which to discuss asymmetric
price movements, there is no formal analysis showing that it is equilibrium price behavior.
Conversely, a number of recent papers have theoretically derived asymmetric pricing as a con-
sequence of search costs. In particular, Lewis (2005), Tappata (2009), Yang and Ye (2008), and
Cabral and Fishman (2008) each find that firms may extract informational rents from consumers
unaware of input cost changes and therefore exhibit price asymmetry. Lewis (2005) posits consumers
to form adaptive expectations about the current market price distribution, and shows that firms
can exploit these irrational beliefs by slowly lowering prices in response to a negative cost change.
Tappata (2009) and Yang and Ye (2008) each construct a model where consumers rationally form
expectations of current market prices, and find, similar to Lewis (2005), that firms capitalize on
buyers’ imperfect information by pricing asymmetrically. Lewis (2005) finds empirical support for
his search-based theory, however, his paper critically relies upon consumers disregarding all current
information in forming their search strategy. To the best of my knowledge, other than Lewis (2005),
no other paper has been able to empirically verify or discredit any specific theory of rockets and
feathers.
The goal of this paper is to employ an expansive data set to determine the underlying cause of
asymmetric pricing. In the process, rockets and feathers is identified as a property of retail gasoline
prices across a wide variety of markets. To investigate the sources of asymmetric pricing, I exploit
1Hereafter referred to as BCG.
2BCG (1997) and Lewis (2005) both discuss this possibility.
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one year of daily regular and premium unleaded gasoline price observations for more than 11,000
firms. An overwhelming majority of the rockets and feathers literature employs temporally and/or
spatially aggregated data to document the phenomenon. In establishing the existence of asymmetric
pricing with data disaggregated to the daily-firm level, I estimate its magnitude with a high degree
of precision. I find that five days after an initial wholesale price shock firms incorporate 46% of a
positive cost change into their final price, but only 24% of a negative change. The difference in the
speed of retail price adjustment to positive and negative cost changes persists for more than eight
days, and the slower adjustment to negative shocks costs consumers an additional 1.3¢ per gallon.
While confirming the existence of asymmetric pricing is in accordance with much of the literature,
heretofore, there has been almost no empirical sifting of the various theoretical explanations of this
pricing behavior. With the aid of a rich data set, I find robust evidence in favor of the consumer
search-based theories posited in Yang and Ye (2008) and Tappata (2009), and little support for
focal price collusion. The theories based upon competition with consumer search offer a number
of testable predictions, three of which are supported by the empirical analysis in this study. First,
Yang and Ye (2008) show that products whose consumers are less likely to shop for the lowest
price are slower to adjust downwards following a negative cost shock, but increase at the same rate
following a cost increase. This implication is confirmed by examining the dynamic properties of
firms’ markup of premium over regular unleaded fuel. Specifically, the gap increases following a
cost decrease but remains constant following a cost increase; premium prices, therefore, fall slower
than regular prices, but rise at the same speed. I argue that there is a systematic difference in the
search costs of consumers who purchase either premium or regular gasoline, and as such confirm
the prediction of Yang and Ye (2008).
By studying the markup of premium over regular, I isolate how specific firms price products
purchased by distinctly different consumers. The value added by this approach to a study such
as Peltzman (2000) is it measures not only the relative asymmetry of different products, but also
how the same firm prices two different goods that are subject to nearly identical cost shocks. Thus,
many important determinants of the dynamic price behavior of the two products are controlled for,
except the type of consumers buying the goods. The unique pricing patterns of premium and regular
gasoline is, therefore, partially attributable to differences between the two products’ consumers.
A second implication of Yang and Ye (2008) and Tappata (2009) is that the gains from search
inversely relate to the magnitude of price asymmetry. This is confirmed by quantifying the connec-
tion between market price dispersion and the degree of price asymmetry; markets with a greater
price range or variance (both positively correlated with gains from search) are found to adjust slower
to cost increases and and faster to decreases. A third test of search-based theory investigates the
pricing pattern of monopolistic firms. The theory predicts that if a market is served by a single firm
then prices will respond with equal speed to price increases and decreases. As such, the empirical
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analysis in this paper shows that monopolies price symmetrically.
In contrast, little evidence in favor of collusion as a consequential determinant of rockets and
feathers is uncovered. After isolating firms with the greatest potential to be acting collusively,
these businesses are found to exhibit no more asymmetry than firms almost certainly not colluding.
Moreover, there is no verifiable relationship between the magnitude of asymmetry and price levels,
suggesting that asymmetric pricing is not a means for collusive firms to inflate prices. In total, the
data strongly suggests that asymmetric pricing is a rational profit maximizing strategy amongst
non-collusive firms operating in a market typified by consumer search costs.
Rockets and feathers has long been established as an empirical regularity of a diverse set of prod-
uct markets. A deep understanding of the pricing phenomenon’s cause, however, has lagged behind.
Theory based on oligopolistic competition with consumer search recently supplied a rigorous foun-
dation upon which to analyze the properties of asymmetric price adjustments. The econometric
results presented in this paper substantiates the theory as an accurate description of the pricing
pattern’s underlying mechanism. Using data that covers a large range of markets and is disaggre-
gated to the daily-firm level adds further robustness to the empirical findings, and consequently,
confidence in the validity of the search theory of rockets and feathers.
The outline of the paper is as follows; section 2 reviews past empirical approaches and introduces
the econometric model used to perform the analysis, section 3 discusses the data and its general
properties, section 4 presents new evidence of rockets and feathers, section 5 tests search-based
theories of price asymmetry, section 6 examines focal price collusion, section 7 concludes, and the
appendix provides a robustness check of the econometric model and illustrates the problems inherent
in time-averaged data used in most previous studies.
2 A Model of Asymmetric Pricing
When Bacon (1991) first tested for the presence of retail price response asymmetry, he specified the
following functional form:
Rt −Rt−1 = β1(ϑ0 + ϑ1Ct−1 −Rt−1) + β2(ϑ0 + ϑ1Ct−1 −Rt−1)2 + t, (1)
where Rt is the retail price at time t, Ct is the price of crude oil, and t is a normally distributed
iid shock. Bacon estimates the coefficient of the quadratic term, β2, to be positive and significantly
different from zero, and subsequently concludes that there exists response asymmetry. However, this
model posits an overly rigid relationship between retail price changes, Rt − Rt−1, and its long-run
relationship with cost, ϑ0 + ϑ1Ct−1 − Rt−1. Specifically, equation (1) restricts retail prices to have
equally proportional adjustments towards the new price equilibrium in each of the periods following
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the initial cost shock. Further shortcomings are detailed in BCG and Geweke (2004).
In light of the restrictions imposed by Bacon (1991), BCG proposed a more general test which
has become the standard identification technique in the rockets and feathers literature. As the
model serves an integral role in the empirical work presented in the following sections, it is useful
to go through the model’s derivation. First, BCG posit a long-run relationship between the price
of wholesale gasoline and the retail price charged by firms:
Rt = φ0 + φ1Ct + t, (2)
where the variables are defined as in equation (1). Given the long-run relationship between retail
price and the cost of gasoline, BCG then posit the short-run response of retail prices to a cost
change. First, ∆Xt = Xt − Xt−1 is defined for any variable of interest X. Then, they define the
short-run effect of a cost change in period t on retail prices in period t to be:
∆Rt = β0∆Ct + t. (3)
Yet, the adjustment of retail prices to changes in the wholesale cost of gasoline do not occur
solely within the period of observation, and may take weeks to fully transmit. Thus, BCG include
lagged changes in cost to arrive at the following equation:
∆Rt =
n∑
j=0
βj∆Ct−j + t. (4)
Here, n is the number of time periods it takes retail prices to fully adjust to a one time cost shock.
Equation (4) restricts retail prices to adjust symmetrically to positive and negative changes in cost.
As the aim of the model is to test whether or not this is a valid assumption, the restriction is
loosened and then tested to see if it has any bite. Thus, equation (4) is rewritten so that separate
coefficients for positive and negative wholesale price changes may be estimated:
∆Rt =
n∑
j=0
(β+j 1(∆Ct−j > 0) + β
−
j 1(∆Ct−j < 0)) + t. (5)
The indicator function 1(·) takes the value of ∆Ct−j if the expression in parenthesis evaluates
true and zero otherwise. The appeal of equation (5) is that it not only allows for asymmetric
price adjustments, but also places minimal restrictions on the path of adjustment over many time
periods to a one time change in wholesale costs. In general, BCG claim that if significant differences
between the coefficients for positive and negative cost shocks, β+j and β
−
j , are estimated then the
available data supports the existence of rockets and feathers.
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Before BCG proceed with the estimation they further enrich the estimated equation. First,
lagged changes in retail price are included to allow for the possibility of previous retail price changes
affecting current pricing decisions. In the long-run firms fully incorporate cost changes into retail
prices; in the short-run, perhaps due to menu costs or competitive considerations, firms may face
a tradeoff between changing retail prices today or in the future. More importantly, BCG reconcile
the model to deal with a problem found throughout the literature on retail gasoline prices. Namely,
retail price and cost series are cointegrated. There exists a common solution to the problem of
cointegration – transforming the model into an error-correction form.3 By adding the one period
lagged residual from equation (2) to equation (5), short-run adjustments to price shocks as well as
the tendency for retail prices and wholesale costs to revert to their long-run relationship can be
separately estimated:
∆Rt =
n∑
j=0
(β+j 1(∆Ct−j > 0) + β
−
j 1(∆Ct−j < 0)) +
n∑
j=1
(γ+j 1(∆Rt−j > 0) + γ
−
j 1(∆Rt−j < 0))
+ ϑ1(Rt−1 − φ1Ct−1 − φ0) + t. (6)
Equation (6) serves as the foundation for BCG’s empirical investigation, which supports the exis-
tence of asymmetric pricing. They find that for up to four weeks following a crude oil price change,
retail prices more quickly incorporate a positive shock; 67% of a positive cost change is included in
the final price after four weeks, but only 38% of a negative change. Yet, BCG also estimate retail
prices to increase for up to two weeks following a price decrease, indicating that their econometric
model may be misspecified or suffer from temporally aggregated data.4
Accordingly, recent literature has contended that BCG’s results critically rely upon data aggre-
gated across time and stations and nonstandard econometric techniques. Galeotti et al. (2003) and
Bachmeier and Griffin (2003) each criticize BCG’s paper for estimating in one step both the long
and short-run adjustments in retail price to cost changes.5 Furthermore, it is noted that due to
BCG’s utilization of 2SLS to estimate parameters of interest, their estimates will converge to the
true values exponentially slower than when using standard OLS. In the appendix of this paper, the
2SLS technique employed by BCG is found to produce implausible results; retail prices immediately
increase by 10% of the size of a cost decrease, and fall by 18% of the size of a cost increase. The
problems associated with BCG’s 2SLS regression are also shown to become accentuated when used
in conjunction with temporally aggregated data.
To correct for the problems thought to exist in BCG, it is proposed to estimate the error-
3The solution was first derived in Engle and Granger (1987).
4BCG utilize bi-weekly city-averaged retail prices for large metropolitan areas in the USA.
5Instead of first estimating equation (2) and substituting the predicted residuals into equation (6), as suggested
by Engle and Granger (1987), BCG directly include Rt−1 and Ct−1 in equation (6).
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correction model in two steps, as originally posited in Engle and Granger (1987). Equation (2)
is first estimated using OLS and then the pertinent values are substituted into (6). Additionally,
equation (6) is generalized to not only allow retail prices to respond asymmetrically to short-run
cost shocks, but also to permit asymmetric adjustments to the new long-run equilibrium. Thus, the
following equation has been put forth in the literature as an improvement over the BCG model:
∆Rt =
n∑
j=0
(β+j 1(∆Ct−j > 0) + β
−
j 1(∆Ct−j < 0)) +
n∑
j=1
(γ+j 1(∆Rt−j > 0) + γ
−
j 1(∆Rt−j < 0))
+ ϑ+1 1(Rt−1 − φ1Ct−1 − φ0 > 0) + ϑ−1 1(Rt−1 − φ1Ct−1 − φ0 < 0) + t. (7)
Here, φ0 and φ1 are estimated via equation (2) and substituted into (7), and ϑ
+
1 and ϑ
−
1 capture
the tendency for retail prices to revert to their long-run relationship with cost. Analysis in the
appendix is in agreement with previous literature in that equation (7) is demonstrated to be the
most appropriate model to identify asymmetric pricing, and therefore, the equation serves as the
foundation of the econometric analysis in this paper.
Galeotti et al. (2003) employ a standard error-correction model similar to equation (7) and
fail to reject symmetric pricing; the study, however, employs monthly averaged prices for entire
European countries, and findings presented in the appendix suggest that data aggregated to this
level is highly susceptible to bias. Eckert (2002) uses weekly averaged retail prices from Windsor,
Ontario in conjunction with equation (6) and finds support for asymmetric pricing; one week after
a cost shock retail prices incorporate 120% of a positive change but only 24% of a negative change.
Deltas (2008) utilizes monthly averaged data for 47 states in the USA in conjunction with equation
(6) and yields evidence in favor of rockets and feathers; one month after an initial price shock retail
prices incorporate 17% more of a positive cost change. Using weekly price observations from South
Orange County, CA, Verlinda (2008) estimates an error-correction model like equation (7) and finds
that three weeks after a cost change retail prices increase by 110% of a positive cost shock, but
decrease by only 83% of a negative shock. Conversely, Hosken et al. (2008) utilize weekly averaged
data from individual firms in the Washington, DC metro area to estimate equation (7) and find
that asymmetric pricing poorly explains the retail price changes in their data.
The aforementioned studies represent only a sample of the empirical asymmetric pricing liter-
ature and, by and large, a substantial body of work has coalesced in favor of prices responding
in greater magnitude to cost increases than decreases.6 In the subsequent sections, equation (7)
is estimated utilizing the two-step OLS estimation procedure in order to identify the existence of
asymmetric pricing in the retail gasoline industry.
6Table 1 offers a brief summary of the rockets and feathers literature. Geweke (2004) gives a more detailed
summary of the asymmetric pricing literature and identification techniques.
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3 Data and Summary Statistics
The econometric analysis in this paper is buoyed by a richly detailed data set consisting of daily
price observations from July 30th, 2008 through July 29th, 2009. Included in the data are station
specific observations for nearly every gas station in the states of New Jersey, Maryland, Virginia,
Washington, as well as the Philadelphia, PA and Washington, DC metro areas. Also included are
firms not in these states, but within approximately 15 miles of their border. This amounts to
over 11,000 unique stations. The data was culled from the website gasprices.mapquest.com whose
information is provided by the Oil Price Information Service (OPIS).7 According to its website, OPIS
collects data “through exclusive relationships with credit card companies, direct feeds, and other
survey methods,” and therefore price observations are measured with a high degree of accuracy.
Every morning at 12:30 a.m. I ran a computer program that gathers the most recent pricing
information posted on mapquest. Each price is accompanied by the date it was reported to OPIS.
While mapquest was scraped at daily intervals, the website does not report a new price for each
station on every day. On average they post new price observations for 72% of stations on weekdays
and 48% on weekends.8
Previous studies of the retail gasoline market have been constrained by data limitations; prices
are averaged across stations (e.g., Eckert (2002), Borenstein and Shepard (1996), Borenstein et al.
(1997)), observations only represent small subsections of a market (e.g., Noel (2009), Noel (2003),
Slade (1992)), retail prices are averaged across time (e.g., Hosken et al. (2008), Borenstein et al.
(1997)), or prices are only collected one day per week (Verlinda (2008), Lewis (2005), and Lewis
(2008)). Moreover, studies that do utilize station-specific daily price observations for complete
markets take their prices from websites whose data is user reported (e.g., Eckert and West (2004),
Lewis and Marvel (2007))9. As pointed out in Atkinson (2008), consumer-reported internet data
may be subject to a host of biases that can lead to misleading results when high time frequency
data or prices for independent stations are needed.
The price data limitations that have hindered previous studies in the rockets and feathers liter-
ature pose less of a concern in this paper.10 The data set is geographically balanced and contains
complete markets, observations occur at daily time frequencies, retail prices derive from credit card
transactions and station self-reporting, not potentially biased consumer reports, and a host of per-
7Figure 2 is a screen shot of the website from where I scraped the data.
8These numbers are consistent with those reported in previous studies whose data is directly obtained from OPIS.
Thus, there is no reason to believe that the data scraped from mapquest represents an incomplete sample of stations
whose prices are reported by OPIS.
9A notable exception is Chandra and Tappata (2008). However, the focus of their paper, to test whether price
dispersion is a consequence of search costs, is unrelated to this paper.
10The appendix confirms that price data aggregated to weekly averages can severely contaminate parameter esti-
mates of equations (6) and (7).
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tinent station characteristic information complements the price data. Thus, I am not only well
equipped to explore the existence of asymmetric pricing, but also to consider its underlying cause.
The daily gasoline spot prices listed on the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) is em-
ployed as the cost variable. Reformulated gasoline delivered from the New York and Los Angeles
Harbors are used for firms located in the eastern and western states, respectively. In reality gas
stations purchase gasoline in the wholesale market at the rack price posted at local terminals or at
the Dealer Tank Wagon (DTW) price, which is negotiated privately between firms and refineries.
While I was unable to obtain this cost data, Chandra and Tappata (2008) note that monthly spot,
rack, and DTW prices are almost perfectly correlated.11 Since retail price responses to changes in
cost is what is of interest, utilizing spot instead of terminal or DTW prices should not limit the
accuracy of results. Another potential concern is which day’s spot price to use for a given day’s
retail price. Even though wholesale costs change daily, gas stations do not receive a new shipment of
gasoline every day. Thus, lagged values of cost reflect the price paid by firms that do not replenish
their inventory on a given day. However, the concurrent day’s spot price reflects the opportunity
cost of holding inventory and is generally the index by which stations set their price.12 Therefore,
in accordance with the literature, I match retail prices with the same day’s spot price.13
The spatial makeup of individual markets plays an important role in the econometric analysis.14
In particular, the number of competing stations within given distances of the firm of interest is
incorporated into each test. To calculate this I first needed to geocode the data.15 A variety of
software packages facilitated this process. First, the addresses were converted into geographical
coordinates by software provided by USC’s Department of Geography and cross referenced with
coordinates determined by Yahoo maps. Any coordinates that did not match or were unable to be
determined with sufficient precision were then geocoded by hand using the Google maps API. Once
every station was coded, the distance between all pairs of firms was calculated using the Euclidean
distance measure. Given these distance measures, I then calculated market concentration for a
variety of market definitions.
Throughout the econometric investigation, a host of control variables supplement the estimated
equations. Table 3 reports summary statistics for pertinent station and market characteristic vari-
ables that are at times included as additional controls. Also reported in the table are the results
11In the appendix of Chandra and Tappata (2008), it is noted that monthly spot, rack, and DTW prices have a
correlation greater than .99.
12The Association for Convenience and Petroleum Retailing, a lobbying group for gas stations, explains in their
2009 Gas Price Kit that firms set their retail price based on the “replacement cost” of gasoline: the current wholesale
price.
13Chandra and Tappata (2008), Lewis (2008), and Verlinda (2008) also use this approach.
14Houde (2009) finds that both market structure and the commuter paths of consumers significantly impact retail
price dynamics.
15Geocoding is the process of converting street addresses into longitude and latitude coordinates.
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of regressing regular unleaded retail price on those traits.16 In step with previous studies, such
as Eckert and West (2004) and Hosken et al. (2008), independent brand retailers are found to
charge significantly lower prices than majors. Additionally, prices increase with the distance to
the closest competitor, which indicates that firms are able to exploit available market power. The
number of competing firms within a given distance has no significant sway over price levels. This is
a consequence of two counteracting effects; the number of firms within a given distance positively
correlates with the degree of competition, which decreases prices levels, but also serves as a proxy
for demand, which positively correlates with price levels. Therefore, the net effect of the number of
firms within a given distance, if no other market characteristics are controlled for, becomes insignif-
icant. Acting as a better representation of local competition is the percentage of competitors that
are not major brands. Table 3 indicates that prices decrease if more competitors are independents.
A host of previous papers find that independent retailers are more likely to undercut their rivals’
prices, thereby increasing market competition.17 Thus, the basic statistics are consistent with the
existing literature.
The time over which I analyze data was a particularly volatile period in the gasoline industry;
the price of oil peaked at just over 126¢ per gallon and fell to a low of 31¢. Figure 1 plots the
wholesale and average retail price for regular unleaded gasoline over this time period, and Table 2
presents summary statistics for the average daily prices of premium, regular, and wholesale gasoline.
The most striking feature of Figure 1 is the rapid decline in gas prices during the autumn of 2008,
which coincides with a financial crisis and worldwide slowdown of production. A primary concern,
given the lengthy downward trend, is that the price and cost series may not be stationary in first
differences. However, augmented Dickey-Fuller tests (Said and Dickey, 1984) assure that both price
and cost are stationary in first differences. Actually, a drastic run-up and/or run-down of the price
of oil is not atypical of data sets used to identify asymmetric pricing; Borenstein et al. (1997),
Bachmeier and Griffin (2003), and Galeotti et al. (2003) all use data encompassing the first Gulf
War (when the price of oil more than doubled), and Verlinda (2008) tests for asymmetry with data
influenced by two major runs on wholesale prices (caused by the Texas to Arizona pipeline rupture
and San Francisco, CA refinery outage). As large swings in the price of oil over short periods of time
are fairly common, the effects of the financial crisis in the data should not be viewed as an anomaly
or hinderance, but as an opportunity to explore asymmetric pricing with data representative of the
inherent volatility of the price of oil.
At first glance retail prices in Figure 1 appear to drop simultaneously with wholesale costs, yet
16Before regressing retail price on station characteristics all taxes are removed. Also, day of the week controls are
included in each of the regressions. For the statistic % independent competitors ≤ .1 miles only stations with at least
one competitor within .1 miles are considered. This analogously holds for the subsequent two statistics in Table 3.
17See Eckert and West (2004) and Noel (2003) for empirical evidence and Eckert (2002) for a theoretical justifica-
tion.
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upon close inspection there exist many instances when costs drop suddenly and retail prices slowly
(or never) follow suit. Around mid-December 2008 and again during mid-July 2009, for example,
there are sharp declines in cost, but retail prices exhibit only a gradual decline. Also consistent
with asymmetric pricing is the noticeably higher retail margins during the large decline in wholesale
prices from mid-September to the end of December. In total, it is not obvious whether retail prices
adjust faster to price increases than decreases, and a careful analysis using the model detailed in
the previous section is needed.
4 Testing for the Presence of Asymmetric Pricing
Prior to testing theories of asymmetric pricing, I first establish its presence in the data. To the best of
my knowledge, no previous study of rockets and feathers has documented the phenomenon with daily
firm-level data for such a large number of geographically diverse firms. Previous firm-level studies
of asymmetric pricing utilized data detailing only a single metropolitan area. Analysis presented in
the appendix illustrates that aggregating data to even weekly averages can contaminate parameter
estimates. Therefore, verifying the phenomenon’s existence with temporally disaggregated data for
firms located in rural and urban markets on both coasts of the USA serves as a useful contribution
to the literature.
To ascertain if retail gasoline firms react more quickly to cost increases than decreases, I es-
timate the error-correction model as recommended in Engle and Granger (1987). That is, I first
estimate equation (2) using OLS, then substitute the parameter values into equation (7) and esti-
mate that equation again using OLS. This estimation procedure is appropriate for several reasons.
First, employing the standard error-correction technique assures separate identification of short-run
responses to cost shocks and the tendency for retail prices to return to their long-run relationship
with costs. Also, the stationarity of the regressors in equation (7) enables standard significance tests
of the parameters and functions of multiple parameters.18 As quantifying the degree of price asym-
metry involves constructing response functions from multiple parameters, estimating the model in
standard error-correction form, as opposed to the non-standard econometric technique employed
in BCG, ensures that I am constructing appropriate confidence intervals to test for asymmetry.
Finally, in light of the recent critiques of BCG in Bachmeier and Griffin (2003) and Galeotti et
al. (2008), I err on the side of caution by following the procedure originally posited in Engle and
18In the following sections I test for asymmetry in the pricing of both premium and regular unleaded gasoline.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests confirm that both price series, as well as the cost series, are stationary in first
differences. Estimation of equation (2), using either premium or regular gasoline as the dependent variable, reveals
a cointegrating relationship with cost. Therefore, estimates of φ0 and φ1 are superconsistent, and it is appropriate
to substitute the residuals of the estimated equation (2) into equation (7) in place of Rt−1 − φ1Ct−1 − φ0, as
superconsistency allows the econometrician to act as though φ0 and φ1 were truly known.
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Granger (1987), whose properties have been widely studied.
Before proceeding with the econometrics, a host of controls are included to account for differences
in local market conditions and firm specific traits. First, station specific fixed effects are added to
equation (2) to allow for the possibility that individual firms employ different long-run markups or
consistently purchase wholesale gasoline at relatively high or low prices. Additionally, equation (7)
is augmented to control for the effect that local competition, demand conditions, and firm traits
may have on short-run adjustments. In particular, the log of population of the city of operation for
each station,19 the number of competitors within .1 miles, between .1 and 1.5 miles, and between
1.5 and 5 miles, the distance of the closest competitor, a dummy variable indicating whether the
station is a major brand,20 and the percentage of independent stations within .1, between .1 and 1.5
miles, and between 1.5 and 5 miles are all added to the equation. Finally, day of the week dummies
are included in the second step of the econometric procedure to control for predictable changes in
demand conditions over the course of the week.21
Regression results are reported in Table 4 with standard errors clustered by station and corrected
for heteroscedasticity.22 The regression produces economically plausible results consistent with the
existence rockets and feathers. The coefficients for being above or below the long-run equilibrium
retail price, ϑ+1 and ϑ
−
1 respectively, are both negative. This implies that when retail prices are
above (below) their long-run equilibrium value there exists downward (upward) pressure guiding
retail prices towards their long-run equilibrium relationship with cost. Also, the estimated value
for the long-run relationship between retail prices and wholesale costs, φ1 in equation (2), is 1.04.
23
Previous literature, such as Verlinda (2008) and Lewis (2005), has argued that if demand is linear
and marginal cost is constant across all quantities then there should be a dollar for dollar pass
through of costs to retail prices in the long-run (i.e. φ1 = 1). While the estimate of φ1 is slightly
above one, it is much closer than the values obtained for the same parameter in most studies of
asymmetric pricing in the retail gasoline industry.24
Supporting the existence of rockets and feathers is that the coefficient on first period positive cost
changes, .08, is significantly greater than for negative cost changes, .00.25 Thus, one day following a
19Population data is either the 2007 projections by the United States Census Bureau, or when the projections are
unavailable, the 2000 census measure.
20I classify Exxon/Mobil, Shell, BP, Texaco, Chevron, Citgo, Amoco, Sunoco, Lukoil, Getty, 76, and Conoco
Phillips stations as major brand, and all others as non-majors. The results are robust to changes in the classification.
21Generally demand is higher during weekdays when there are a greater number of drivers commuting to work.
Also, weekend drivers may be less informed about the market price distribution because they are not necessarily
traveling along their usual commuter routes.
22For this regression, and all subsequent analysis performed at daily time intervals, the lag lengths for cost and
retail price changes are set to ten. I do not report all of the estimated coefficients for lack of room, but they are
available upon request.
23The parameter is estimated with a standard error of .0004, but is not reported in Table 4.
24For example, Verlinda (2008) estimates φ1 = 1.38 and Lewis (2005) finds φ1 = .48.
25This is true at the 99% confidence level.
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10¢ positive cost shock retail prices increase by .8¢, but do not change following a negative shock.
This alone, however, is not proof of asymmetric pricing, as I must account for a complicated lag
structure and track the entirety of the dynamic price adjustment. To accomplish this, the estimated
parameters are used to construct cumulative response functions (CRF’s), which map the adjustment
of retail prices over time in response to a one time, one cent change in wholesale cost. The CRF’s
are formulated using the equations specified in the appendix of Borenstein et al. (1997).26 After an
initial one cent increase to costs at t = 0, the period k change in retail price, B+k , is determined by:
B+k =B
+
k−1 + β
+
k + ϑ
+
1 max{(Bk−1 − φ1), 0}+ ϑ−1 min{0, (Bk−1 − φ1)}
+
k∑
i=1
(γ+i max{0, Bk−i −Bk−i−1}+ γ−i min{0, Bk−i −Bk−i−1}). (8)
Then, the CRF is a recursive function which sums n equations, where n is the number of periods it
takes retail prices to completely respond to a one time change in cost, and the period k ∈ {1, ..., n}
cumulative adjustment is as stated in equation (8). The CRF detailing the response to a cost
decrease is defined analogously to equation (8).
Figure 3 plots the CRF’s and 95% confidence intervals corresponding to the regression in Table
4, and it is clear that the existence of rockets and feathers is a widespread phenomenon in the retail
gasoline industry. Here, the vertical axis plots the percentage of the total cost shock that has been
incorporated into the final retail price.27 For just over eight days following a one time cost shock,
the cumulative response is significantly greater for positive than negative shocks. This result is in
step with much of the literature, but serves as a stark contrast to the findings of Bachmeier and
Griffin (2003) and Galeotti et al. (2008) who employ the same estimation procedure to reject the
existence of rockets and feathers. As these studies attribute the rejection of the phenomenon to
utilizing a more reliable estimation procedure than BCG, I note that even when employing the more
appropriate techniques the data overwhelmingly supports the existence of the pricing behavior.28
To highlight the presence of price asymmetry, as well as the cost it presents to consumers, I
measure the loss in consumer welfare due to the pricing behavior. Welfare loss is calculated by
subtracting the monetary gain consumers enjoy from a cost decrease from the losses accrued by a
26I depart from BCG’s specification only in that retail prices are allowed to asymmetrically return to their long-run
relationship with cost.
27In Figure 3, for example, the fourth day after a cost change firms are estimated to have raised retail prices by
38% of the size of a positive shock and to have lowered prices by 18% of the size of a negative shock.
28This is not to say that this paper’s findings are inconsistent with the other two studies. Bachmeier and Griffin
(2003) investigates the connection between oil shocks and wholesale prices. Galeotti et al. (2008) employs monthly
averaged price data, and in the appendix temporal aggregation is found to contaminate parameter estimates. It is of
note, however, that the aforementioned studies claim their finding of non-existence of price asymmetry is partially
attributable to the model choice, yet this paper employs the same model and finds existence.
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cost increase:29
∆Wn =
∫ n
j=0
(B+j −B−j )dj. (9)
Here, B+j and B
−
j are defined as in equation (8), and linear interpolation is used to approximate the
CRF’s at non-integer values. The results are graphed in Figure 4, and the welfare loss to consumers
as a result of asymmetric pricing becomes clear; the cumulative cost to consumers increases for
up to ten days following a wholesale gasoline price shock. Ten days after the initial one cent cost
change consumers lose about 1.3¢ more from an increase than they gain from a decrease, and the
difference is significantly different from zero with 99% confidence.
As another gauge of the welfare implication of asymmetric pricing, I calculate how much a
typical driver would have saved over the time spanned by the data if retail prices had adjusted
symmetrically. To perform this counterfactual, retail prices are predicted under the assumption
that they respond with equal speed to positive and negative cost shocks, and compared to the
case of asymmetric adjustment. More specifically, symmetric prices are generated using parameter
estimates of equation (7), but lagged negative changes in cost parameters, β−j , are replaced with the
estimates for positive cost changes, β+j . Additionally, ϑ
+
1 , the effect of price being above its long-run
relationship with cost, is replaced with ϑ−1 , the effect of price being below its long-run relationship
with cost, to ensure retail prices descend to their long-run equilibrium following a negative cost
shock at the same speed they are estimated to rise to their long-run equilibrium after a positive
shock. Asymmetric prices are predicted using the true estimates of equation (7).
Figure 5 plots the predictions of asymmetric and symmetric retail prices using the daily NYMEX
spot price for regular unleaded gasoline as the cost data.30 Symmetrically adjusting prices are
always lower, and, on average, are 4.05¢ less than asymmetric prices. The US Department of
Transportation reported 205 million licensed drivers in 2007. Using this as an approximation of the
number of gasoline consumers, in conjunction with monthly regular fuel gross consumption data, I
estimate the gallons of fuel purchased per consumer on each day from August 8th, 2008 through
July 29th, 2009.31 Each driver purchased, on average, .63 gallons of fuel per day. In turn, the
typical gasoline consumer would have spent $9.33 less on fuel over this time if prices had responded
symmetrically to cost shocks. This amounts to an additional $1.91 billion in savings across the
entire driving population of the United States. Thus, I find strong evidence in favor of asymmetric
pricing and that it poses a real cost to consumers.
29This is the same measure of consumer welfare as in BCG.
30The spot price used in the predictions is a daily weighted-average of the closing spot price of reformulated
gasoline shipped from the Los Angeles, CA and NY, NY Harbors; the weights used to average the cost data reflect
the proportion of gas stations in the data set located in the west or east coast of the United States.
31Gasoline consumption data is made publicly available by the Energy Information Administration.
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5 Search Costs as the cause of Asymmetric Pricing
5.1 Theoretical Background and Testable Hypothesis
The identification of asymmetric pricing in the retail gasoline market is in step with much of the
previous empirical literature. Until recently, however, rockets and feathers was thought to be at odds
with microeconomic theory. Informal models of focal price collusion were conjectured as the cause,
but no rigorous theory or empirical support has surfaced. On the other hand, formal models of
asymmetric pricing as a consequence of consumer search costs have been developed in recent years.
For the purposes of this paper, I focus on the results of Yang and Ye (2008) and Tappata (2009);
the two studies offer unique models with qualitatively similar results. Before the implications of
the two papers are tested it is helpful to outline the models and intuition underlying the results.
Both models rely upon the assumption that consumers do not observe firms’ marginal cost
of production, but may learn this cost through market search and purchase decisions. In each
period every firm faces the same marginal cost, which evolves according to a Markov process; the
underlying parameters of the Markov process are common knowledge to both firms and consumers.
In equilibrium firms use mixed strategies to set prices, and both studies prove that there exists
more price dispersion when costs are low. Consumers with nonzero search costs have a greater
incentive to search when prices are more dispersed, as the expected gain from obtaining additional
price quotes is higher when the distribution of prices is more spread out. Therefore, consumers
search more intensely when they believe marginal costs to be low.
Given these preliminary results, both papers consider a dynamic setting whereby marginal costs
can take one of two values, high or low. Additionally, costs are assumed to exhibit persistence (i.e.
the probability of costs remaining the same next period is greater than 1
2
). First, consider the case
when costs transition from a low state in period one to a high state in the next period. Through
search and purchase decisions in the first period consumers update their beliefs in favor of marginal
costs being low. Due to the persistence of costs, consumers then believe that costs are likely to
remain low the next period, and therefore, have a strong incentive to search in period two. However,
if the costs become high in period two then consumers are likely to discover the cost change due
to their high search intensity. Firms, therefore, adjust prices upwards quickly to reflect updated
consumer knowledge.
On the other hand, consider the case when costs are high in period one and transition to low
in period two. After period one consumers update their beliefs to reflect the high cost state, and
optimally choose a lower search intensity for period two. If, however, costs drop in period two
consumers are less likely to discover the change due to their lower search intensity. Firms then
have a low incentive to drop prices as consumers’ beliefs are less likely to incorporate the cost drop.
In total, retail prices adjust slower to cost decreases than increases. While this discussion is a
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simplification of Yang and Ye (2008) and Tappata (2009) it captures the basic intuition; consumers
are less likely to be informed about a cost decrease, and consequently, firms lower prices slowly so
as to profitably exploit consumers’ lack of knowledge.
The theory developed in Yang and Ye (2008) and Tappata (2009) offers testable predictions,
three of which I address in the following subsections. First, Yang and Ye (2008) prove that if the
proportion of “shoppers”, consumers that face zero search costs, increases then retail prices will
adjust downward more slowly in response to a negative cost shock.32 Intuitively, if the number
of shoppers in a market decrease then there is less equilibrium search. Therefore, consumers are
generally less informed when costs drop, and consequently, retail prices fall slower. A second
verifiable consequence of search-based theory is that greater expected gains from search result in
a lower magnitude of price asymmetry. This is true as larger gains from search incentivize more
equilibrium search, and thereby, consumers are better informed. Firms are then less able to take
advantage of unknowledgable buyers, and prices descend more quickly. A final search theoretic result
is that a monopoly will price symmetrically. These firms will not exhibit price asymmetry as they
maximize profit by setting the monopoly price each period, and this price responds symmetrically
to cost shocks. In the following three subsections I carefully test these three implications of theories
based upon competition with consumer search.
5.2 Prices Fall Slower When Consumers Search Less: The Case of Pre-
mium Fuel
To empirically examine the consequences of search-based price asymmetry, I rely upon the differ-
ences in consumers who purchase regular versus premium unleaded gasoline. Premium gasoline has
a higher octane rating33 than regular fuel, and in my data set, sold for, on average, 25.6¢ more per
gallon. However, in cars manufactured since the early 1990’s almost all engines have been designed
to automatically correct engine knocking, thereby rendering the performance advantage of premium
gasoline almost negligible (Ford 2008).34 In spite of this fact, many luxury vehicles’ warranties may
be voided if anything but premium fuel is put into the tank. Thus, drivers of more expensive cars
are more likely to purchase premium gasoline than owners of less expensive automobiles. Luxury
car owners tend to have higher incomes, and Barron et al. (2000) presents convincing evidence that
high income consumers that purchase premium fuel are typified by greater search costs. Consumers
that are not required by warranty to purchase premium fuel pay a large markup for a product that
offers almost no perceptible benefit over regular fuel. Healey (2003) notes, “engineers, scientists and
the federal government say there’s little need for premium.” Consequently, consumers not bound
32This claim is explicitly stated and proved in Proposition 8 of Yang and Ye (2008).
33Octane rating measures a fuel’s resistance to engine knocking.
34Also, premium gasoline neither increases fuel efficiency nor reduces harmful emissions.
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by contract to purchase high octane fuel, but still choose to do so, are ill informed. Consumers
that do not acquire information pertaining to product value can accurately be described as having
a high cost of search for product quality information. Any correlation between consumers’ search
cost for obtaining product quality information and price information translates into purchasers of
premium gasoline having a high cost of price search. Additionally, Manzan et al. (2009) finds that
consumers of premium gasoline are exceedingly more demand inelastic than regular buyers across
all price levels.
Given that consumers of premium gasoline generally earn higher incomes, are far less price
sensitive, and possibly less informed than consumers of regular fuel it appears safe to assume that
premium customers are (i) typified by higher search costs and (ii) less likely to be a “shopper” for the
lowest possible price.35 Assumptions (i) and (ii) in conjunction with Yang and Ye’s (2008) prediction
that a lower proportion of shoppers increases price asymmetry allows the following hypothesis to
be tested.
Hypothesis 1 Firms price premium gasoline with a greater magnitude of asymmetry than regular
fuel, and the increased asymmetry is entirely a result of slower adjustment to cost decreases.
Before undertaking the analysis, an issue in the data must first be dealt with; the data set only
contains new premium fuel price observations for, on average, 12% of stations each day. Conse-
quently, if empirical testing is performed on the station-level at daily intervals then a majority of
the data will be dropped from the analysis.36 To ameliorate the problem and maximize the amount
of information extracted from the data, the following analysis is performed at the daily market-level
(as opposed to firm-level). It is more prudent to spatially aggregate the data than to average it
across time because results presented in the appendix convey that temporally aggregating data can
severely bias results, but little is changed by averaging prices across cities. Defining a market in
the retail gasoline industry can be difficult; firms one mile apart may compete with each other, but
the total set of competitors that each faces may not be the same. Essentially the retail gasoline
industry consists of a large number of overlapping markets, of which each firm may belong to more
than one. This caveat is addressed in the same fashion as Chandra and Tappata (2008) and Lewis
(2008); each firm is specified to be operating in a unique market of which they are located at the
center. Then, I define a market to be a 1.5 mile radius around each firm.37
To test the implications of search-based asymmetry, I first confirm that premium and regular
prices respond asymmetrically to cost shocks, and premium and regular prices positively correlate
35Here, “shopper” is defined as in the previous subsection: a consumer with zero search cost.
36When lag lengths are set to ten a firm needs to have a run of eleven consecutive price observations to be included
in the regression .
37Lee (2009) finds that stations compete most heavily with competitors within one mile. I extend the market
radius an extra half mile to ensure that I capture all pertinent competitive dynamics.
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with wholesale costs.38 Given these results, I then show that within specific markets premium and
regular prices respond at the same speed to positive cost shocks, but premium falls slower after a
negative cost change – thus confirming a prediction of search-based rockets and feathers theory.
To begin, equation (7) is estimated using the same cost measures as in the previous section,
but firm prices are replaced with market average prices. In estimating the long-run relationship
between market price and cost (equation (2)) market-specific fixed effects are included, and a host
of controls supplement equation (7): the number of competitors and the percentage of those who are
independently branded in the market and between 1.5 and 5 miles of the market center, the log of
population of the market, and day of the week controls. Regression results are reported in columns
one and two of Table 5 for both premium and regular gasoline, respectively, and Figure 6 plots the
corresponding CRF’s.39 Figure 6 illustrates that for more than nine days following an initial price
shock premium fuel prices respond in greater magnitude to positive shocks than negative shocks,
and this is true with 95% confidence. Also, premium reacts faster than regular to both positive and
negative cost shocks. Premium prices do initially act slower in response to a negative cost shock,
but by the sixth day after the shock its cumulative response is statistically greater than that of
the regular price series. However, premium and regular gasoline exhibit no statistically significant
difference in the magnitude of price asymmetry, as measured by equation (9).
While this analysis confirms that premium gasoline prices respond asymmetrically to cost shocks,
not much can be said yet in regards to the relationship between consumer search costs and asym-
metric pricing. To support the findings in Yang and Ye (2008) and Tappata (2009) I would like to
show that premium prices fall slower than regular prices but rise at the same speed. Even though
these regressions do not appear to support the theory’s predictions, a closer and more careful look
at the data reveals estimates largely consistent with search-based theory. The trouble with the
tests reported in columns one and two of Table 5 is that the behavior of individual firms is muted.
Comparing the premium and regular CRF’s in Figure 6, for example, is analogous to measuring
how a firm in Seattle, WA prices premium relative to how a firm in Philadelphia, PA prices regular;
while this may yield some insight it disregards the fact that the firm in Seattle sets both a premium
and regular price, and it is the relative movement of those two prices that should be compared.
Nevertheless, it is important to illustrate that when estimating the model with market average
prices both types of fuel exhibit a significant degree of price asymmetry and positively correlate
with the wholesale cost series.
38In the previous section, regular fuel prices were found to exhibit price asymmetry. In this subsection, I show
that this still holds when estimating the model with market-level data.
39Standard errors reported in Table 5 are clustered by market and corrected for heteroscedasticity. As individual
firms belong to multiple markets this remedies the real possibility of error terms in equation (7) being correlated
across observations. Also, I only include markets for which I have both premium and regular price data. Again all
parameter estimates are not listed due to space constraints, but are available upon request.
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A more informative estimation technique is to measure how premium prices move relative to
regular prices within a given market, and then estimate the behavior of a typical market. Therefore,
I now examine the dynamic behavior of the markup of premium over regular gasoline. By estimating
the response to cost shocks of market average markups of premium over regular fuel I can isolate
how the same firms price the two products over time. To begin, I create a new price series:
Dit = Pit −Rit. (10)
Here, Pit and Rit are the premium and regular prices, respectively, set in market i during time
period t, and Dit represents the markup of premium over regular gasoline. Dit then acts as the
price variable in equations (2) and (7), and the spot price of WTI crude oil traded on NYMEX is
utilized as the cost variable. The spot price of oil is used instead of wholesale regular unleaded fuel
to guard against the possibility that cost changes reflect shocks to regular unleaded fuel that are
unrelated to premium gasoline.40 Using the price of crude oil as the cost measure ensures that cost
changes only reflect movement in the cost component shared by both types of fuel.
I first estimate equation (2) and obtain economically plausible results. The relationship between
the markup of premium over regular fuel and cost (φ1) is found to be .008 and the constant (φ0) is
26.3, both estimated with more than 99% confidence. Thus, the long-run markup of premium fuel
over regular gasoline is nearly constant at 26.3¢; it only increases by .8¢ for every dollar increase in
the per gallon price of oil. These coefficients are then substituted into equation (7), and the results
of estimating the equation are listed in Table 5 and the corresponding CRF’s are plotted in Figure
7. The most striking feature of the CRF’s plotted in Figure 7 is the distinct negative proportional
response to a negative cost shock. This translates into Dit, the gap between premium and regular
prices, increasing when costs decrease. Figure 6 illustrates that both premium and regular prices
drop in response to negative cost shocks; thereby, premium prices necessarily fall slower than regular
prices in any given market in order for the gap to increase. The reaction to positive cost shocks is
another story; the markup of premium over regular fuel barely changes. Only on days 2 through 4
after a positive cost shock can it be stated with 95% confidence that the response is greater than
zero, and the amount above zero represents an economically meaningless change (less than .05¢ in
response to a 1¢ cost change). That the markup does not change in response to a positive shock is
highlighted in Table 5 where the only variables that are not significant are Dit’s response to lagged
positive cost changes of length 1,3, and 4. Figure 6 demonstrates both premium and regular prices
increasing in response to a positive cost shock; therefore, premium and regular prices must rise
40If there were to be a negative price shock to wholesale unleaded fuel that did not affect the premium market it
could cause the price of regular fuel to drop, but leave premium prices unchanged. This would bias results in favor
of search-based theory. However, when the wholesale price of unleaded fuel is used as the cost measure the results
are qualitatively identical.
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at the same rate in a given market for the markup to remain constant. In conclusion, premium
prices fall slower than regular prices in response to a negative cost shock, but rise at the same
pace following a positive cost change. These estimates confirm hypothesis 1 and support consumer
search costs as the mechanism behind rockets and feathers.
5.3 Search Incentives and the Magnitude of Asymmetry
In this subsection, I measure the relationship between the gains from search and asymmetry. In
formulating their theory of rockets and feathers, Tappata (2009) and Yang and Ye (2008) both
find that consumers increase their search intensity when prices are expected to be more dispersed.
The result is a consequence of more varied prices offering consumers greater potential savings, and
thereby, an increased incentive to search. And, according to Tappata (2009) and Yang and Ye
(2008), a more intensively searching consumer-base implies less market asymmetry.
Hypothesis 2 Markets with greater price dispersion exhibit less price asymmetry.
While yielding evidence in favor of hypothesis 2 would be consistent with search-based asymmetric
pricing theory, the issue of causality must also be considered. The assumption underlying hypoth-
esis 2 is that markets with more dispersed prices cause consumers to increase their intensity of
search; however, a higher degree of search may also serve to drive down price-cost margins, leading
to less price dispersion. Therefore, it is not entirely clear whether markets with low price disper-
sion discourage consumer search, or have low dispersion as a direct result of intensely searching
consumers. To distinguish between the two cases, robustness checks are undertaken following the
tests of hypothesis 2. Still, note that a direct consequence of search-based theory is that exogenous
price dispersion negatively correlates with the magnitude of market price asymmetry.
The econometric tests in this and subsequent subsections will largely follow the same pattern:
(i) define a market/firm characteristic that partitions the data and (ii) separately estimate the
magnitude of asymmetry for the partitioned markets/firms. More formally, let d = {d1, ..., dn}
be a set of dummy variables such that di = 1 for a firm if they satisfy some condition (such as
their closest competitor is located between 1 and 2 miles away) and di = 0 otherwise, and for
each firm dj = 1 and d−j = 0 for some j ∈ {1, ..., n}. Then create a new vector of variables
Ω ≡ {α11, ..., α1n, ..., αmn}, where n = |d| and m is the number of independent variables in equation
(7), by interacting each dummy variable with each independent variable in equation (7). Finally,
each αij ∈ Ω is added to equation (7), the new equation is estimated, and the estimated parameters
are used to separately construct CRF’s for each group of markets/firms.41
41Due to the large number of parameters in each regression the parameter estimates used to construct CRF’s
throughout this section are not reported. They are available upon request.
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In this subsection, markets are partitioned according to their degree of price dispersion, and
in accordance with hypothesis 2, CRF’s estimated for low dispersion markets exhibit a higher
magnitude of asymmetry. As a first proxy for the gains from search, I calculate the average difference
between the maximum and minimum price for regular unleaded fuel in each market over the course
of the data. This statistic captures, on average, the most a consumer can save by visiting each
firm in the market. I then divide the average price range distribution into quintiles and accordingly
partition the set of markets. Figure 8 plots the estimated CRF’s for firms that fall in either the
first or fifth quintile, and the magnitude of asymmetry is greater for markets with a low average
price range.42 The average price range of markets in the first quintile is 4.3¢ compared to 21.9¢
for markets in the fifth quintile. Thus, consumers have a much stronger incentive to search in
markets belonging to the upper quintile as apposed to the lower quintile. And, in accordance with
search-based theory, there is a greater degree of asymmetry (1.01¢ cumulative difference ten days
after a one cent cost shock) in markets with a lower incentive to search.43
Similar results are derived when the connection between average price variance in a market
and the magnitude of asymmetry is measured. If the variance is close to zero then acquiring
price information for an additional firm will yield minimal financial reward; conversely, a high
price variance presents the opportunity for consumers to gain substantial surplus by searching for
additional price data. Thus, search theory predicts an inverse relationship between the degree of
price asymmetry and the average variance of prices in a market. As such, I estimate CRF’s for
markets in the upper or lower quintile of the price variance distribution, and again find support for
search-based asymmetry. While the results are not as strong as with the previous measure of gains
from search, the CRF’s plotted in Figure 9 illustrate that for more than two days following a cost
shock markets with a lower average variance exhibit more asymmetry.44 Moreover, the difference
in asymmetry is almost entirely due to low variance markets reacting more slowly to negative cost
shocks. In sum, both measures of search incentives reveal a significant relationship with the rockets
and feathers phenomenon, and in the direction posited by search theory.
While these results are consistent with search-based asymmetric pricing, there exists another
plausible explanation; markets with low price dispersion are populated by consumers who rigorously
search for the lowest price. In other words, it may be that consumers are so well informed that
all firms are forced to price near cost. In turn, firms in these markets exhibit a low gap between
the highest and lowest price. Thus, it is not known if well informed consumers push the price gap
close together or a small price gap provides disincentive for consumers to engage in costly search.
To distinguish between the two cases, I test the relationship between market price levels and the
42Similar to the previous subsection, this analysis was performed at the daily market level using the same market
definition and set of additional controls.
43This is true at the 95% confidence level.
44This claim is made with 95% confidence.
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proxies for search incentives. If a negative correlation between price variance or range and price
levels exists then it is unlikely that intense consumer search causes a low price range or variance.
In measuring this relationship it is prudent to remove fixed effects from market price levels.
Certain markets may set lower prices because wholesale gasoline is cheaper in that area or the
market contains firms selling a lower quality gasoline.45 Additionally, retail gasoline prices reflect
the value of secondary products, such as car repair service or grocery items, also sold at the station.
The data set does not allow for the effect these characteristics have over market prices to be directly
controlled. Accounting for the impact quality, branding, secondary services, etc., is important in
determining which markets set prices higher than the value of the product would normally dictate.
Fortunately, in the retail gasoline industry the effect of these factors remains constant over time,
and can be controlled for by including a fixed effect variable in equation (2). Thus, to clean price
levels of market fixed effects, I estimate the following equation:
Rit = φ0 + φ1Cit + FEi + it, (11)
and then calculate Git = Rit − FEi. Subtracting market fixed effects, FEi, from the true price
allows for market characteristics (and firm traits within the market) that do not vary over time
to be controlled. Then, two separate regressions are performed: average price range regressed on
average cleaned market price and average price variance regressed on average cleaned market price.
Both tests reveal a negative relationship between price levels and the gains from search, which is
significant with over 99% confidence.46 Thus, markets posited to provide a low incentive to search
actually set higher prices. It is, therefore, unlikely that the cause of low price dispersion is intense
consumer search, which would serve to drive down prices, and in turn, confidence can be instilled in
the proxies for the incentive to search. Consequently, a negative correlation between average price
range (or variance) and the magnitude of price asymmetry stands as strong evidence in favor of
hypothesis 2 and search-based theory of asymmetric pricing.
5.4 Monopolies Price Symmetrically
Next, I test whether firms with substantial monopoly power incorporate positive cost shocks into
their final price more quickly than negative shocks. Asymmetric pricing that arises from consumer
search costs disappears if consumers are only capable of purchasing from a single firm, which implies
the following testable hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3 Monopolists price symmetrically.
45Even though gasoline is a relatively homogenous good consumers may perceive more heavily advertised brands
as selling higher quality gasoline.
46The coefficient on Git when range is regressed on it is −.068 and is −.241 for variance.
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To test hypothesis 3, I isolate firms with no nearby competitors and measure the extent to which
they react more quickly to positive than negative cost shocks. If rockets and feathers is indeed a
competitive phenomenon then there should be no distinction between the rate at which monopolies
incorporate positive and negative cost changes into their sale price.
In order to extract firms from the data set who operate as monopolies, or at least have substantial
monopoly power, I first estimate the distribution of the “closest competitor” control variable. This
variable states, for each firm, the distance between the firm and its nearest rival. Figure 10 plots
the distribution, and the goal is to determine whether firms located in the tail, those without a
competitor within a few miles, price symmetrically. I estimate the speed of adjustment to cost
shocks for firms located in the top 2.5 percentile of the “closest competitor” distribution. The
average distance to the nearest competitor for these firms is 3.5 miles and the minimum distance
to the closest competitor is 2.2 miles. After estimating equation (7) at the firm-day level for only
firms in the top 2.5 percentile of the distribution, the parameters are substituted into equation
(9) to measure the magnitude of asymmetry. Equation (9) calculates, for each day following a
cost change, the cumulative adjustment of retail prices following a positive cost shock minus the
cumulative adjustment after a negative shock. For a firm to exhibit rockets and feathers pricing,
the estimated function must be significantly greater than zero.
Figure 11 plots the estimated function and confidence intervals given by equation (9), and it is
apparent that firms facing soft competition price with no asymmetry. Here, the estimated function is
found to be only slightly above zero, and the upper and lower bounds of the 95% confidence interval
are almost symmetric about zero. Thus, there is no reason to suspect that monopolies implement
rockets and feathers as a pricing strategy. To ensure that this result is because monopolies indeed
price symmetrically, and not that the regression lacked power, I perform the same test for firms in
the lowest 2.5 percentile of the “closest competitor” distribution. These are firms whose nearest
rival is no more than .013 miles away. The result of estimating equation (9) for these firms is plotted
in Figure 12, and firms with a nearby competitor exhibit price asymmetry statistically greater than
zero with 95% confidence for up to four days following a cost shock. As there are the same number
of observations in this estimation as the monopoly test, it can be assured that the lack of statistical
significance for the monopoly group is indeed a consequence of the firms pricing symmetrically.
Thus, the empirical results are consistent with hypothesis 3 and the predictions of search-based
asymmetry.
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6 Focal Price Collusion
6.1 Theoretical Background
The econometrics of the previous section revealed that products whose customers have greater
search costs are priced with greater asymmetry, markets with less to gain from search exhibit more
asymmetry, and monopoly power translates into symmetric pricing. These finding are all consistent
with the theory presented in Yang an Ye (2008) and Tappata (2009). Another common explanation
for rockets and feathers is that when prices decrease firms coordinate on the previous period’s price
in an effort to artificially maintain high prices. In fact, the finding that monopolies exhibit no price
asymmetry is consistent with focal price collusion being the underlying mechanism. This section,
however, presents sound evidence against collusion being a meaningful determinant of rockets and
feathers. After pinpointing firms in the data with the highest potential for collusion, I find that
neither the highest priced nor the most cooperative subsets of these firms are more likely to price
asymmetrically.
Borenstein, Cameron, and Gilbert (1997) offered a stylized version of the collusion model de-
veloped in Green and Porter (1984) as a motivation for the rockets and feathers phenomenon. In
BCG’s explanation, firms use the previous period’s output price as a focal point for collusion. If
costs drop then the previous period’s price is maintained until a firm cheats on the agreement and
triggers a price war. Conversely, if costs increase then firms raise their price to maintain a posi-
tive margin and/or not be viewed as cheating on the collusive agreement. In sum, market prices
adjust slower to cost decreases than increases. While this brand of focal price collusion generates
price asymmetry, BCG only conjecture it to be the cause of the phenomenon and provide no for-
mal model. Subsequent studies that posit focal price collusion to generate asymmetry provide no
proof that coordinating on the previous period’s price maximizes firms’ profits. Despite the lack of
formal theory supporting focal price collusion as a profit maximizing strategy, it has become a com-
mon explanation for asymmetric pricing, and Lewis (2005) does provide some supporting empirical
evidence.
6.2 Empirical Tests of Focal Price Collusion
If collusion is the root cause of asymmetric pricing then firms engaging in the (possibly tacit)
agreement, and thereby exhibiting a substantial degree of price asymmetry, should be able to
sustain prices at least as high as similar, but non-collusive firms. If the collusive firms set lower
prices than their rivals then they would be better off breaking the agreement and setting the price
charged by the non-collusive firms. Consequently, if focal price collusion is the cause of rockets and
feathers there should exist a positive correlation between the magnitude of asymmetry and price
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levels.
In making this connection, however, the influence of consumer demand and other pertinent
market characteristics over retail prices must be removed. Given the geographic variability in the
data, it would make little sense to simply test the correlation between average prices and the degree
of asymmetry, as firms in the data set face a wide variety of demand conditions. Therefore, “high
priced” (“low priced”) firms are defined as those who consistently price above (below) their market’s
average price. By measuring a firm’s price relative to other firms in the same market, both long-run
variability in demand across markets and short-run demand shocks can be controlled for in the
econometric process. Note, however, that firms that generally price above the market average may
do so because they offer a higher quality product. If price levels are largely driven by quality then
“high priced” firms may not be those entered in collusive agreements. In essence, the power of
the subsequent tests of collusion is dependent upon the extent to which collusion influences price-
cost margins relative to other factors, such as product quality. Yet, if focal price collusion does
significantly raise price levels and generate price asymmetry then the following hypothesis will hold
true.
Hypothesis 4 Groups of closely located firms that consistently price above the market average
exhibit more asymmetry than firms that price below the average.
To test hypothesis 4, I first isolate the set of retailers most likely to be participating in a collusive
agreement. Therefore, the data set is refined to only include firms that have exactly one competitor
within .1 miles. In general, the ability to maintain collusion decreases in the number of firms entered
in the agreement and increases in the ability to monitor behavior. By isolating firms with a single
rival whose prices are costlessly observable, only firms with the maximum potential for collusion are
included in the analysis. Then, both the average price charged by the two closely located firms, pft,
and the average price charged by all other firms within 1.5 miles, pkt, for each day t, are calculated.
Given these values the following dummy variable, dpt, is constructed:
dpt =
{
1 if pft − pkt > 0
0 otherwise .
(12)
In words, dpt takes a value of one if and only if the average price of the two firms is greater than
the market average on day t. The dummy variable, therefore, distinguishes between retailers who
fall above or below the approximate mean of their market’s price distribution on a particular day.
After partitioning firms according to dpt in each time period, the next step is to isolate firms who
consistently fall above, or below, the mean of the the daily price distribution. Specifically, two more
dummy variables, indicating “high priced” and “low priced” firms, are created using the following
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statistic:
S =
∑
t∈Tj
dpt
|Tj| . (13)
Here, Tj is the set of days for which I have available price data for the firms in market j. S then
calculates the percentage of days such that the average price of the closely located firms is greater
than the market average. This statistic allows for a distinction to be made between firms who
regularly price above, or below, their competitors. After partitioning the distribution of S values
into quintiles, I estimate CRF’s for the pairs of firms located in the upper and lower quintile.47
Firms in the lower quintile price above the market average between 0 and 17% of the time and
firms in the upper quintile price above the market average between 72% and 100% of the days.
Figure 13 plots the CRF’s for pairs of firms that consistently price above or below their market’s
average, and the line estimates find low priced firms pricing more asymmetrically; they adjust faster
to positive cost shocks and slower to negative cost changes. This is a direct contradiction of the
prediction of rockets and feathers generated by focal price collusion; high priced firms should price
more asymmetrically. Despite the appearance of low priced firms as more asymmetric in Figure 13,
at the 95% confidence level, there is no statistical distinction between positive or negative reactions
between the two types of firms.48 Moreover, there is no significant difference in the magnitude of
asymmetry as measured by equation (9). Thus, the estimations yield no support for focal price
collusion as the determinant of rockets and feathers.
As a robustness check, I classify low and high priced firms using a different definition and
estimate their response to cost shocks. First, the analysis is refocused to the market level, and a
market is defined as in the previous subsection; each firm exists at the center of a unique market
of radius 1.5 miles.49 Then, equation (11) is estimated using OLS, where Rit is the average market
price for regular fuel in market i at time t, Cit is the wholesale cost, and FEi is a market specific
fixed effect. FEi captures the extent to which a market’s retail price varies, on average, from the
price predicted by the long-run relationship between price and cost. Markets with a fixed effect well
above zero generally have a higher price than other markets in the data set, and markets with a
fixed effect well below zero typically set a lower price. The advantage of defining high and low priced
markets in this way is that it enables detection of focal price collusion involving firms throughout
an entire market. The previous definition may exclude closely located pairs of firms whose collusive
prices are part of a larger agreement across the market. The disadvantage to this new definition is
47I estimate equation (7) using the average price of the two closely located firms as the retail price variable. Thus,
I am performing a market-level daily analysis where a market is defined as having a firm at the center and the .1
mile radius around the firm. The data is restricted to only include a firm with one competitor within .1 miles.
48To say there is no statistical distinction in the magnitude of asymmetry means that this is true from the first
day following a price shock until prices have completely adjusted to the new equilibrium.
49For this analysis all firms are allowed to be at the center of a unique market, not just those with one competitor
within .1 miles.
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that differences across markets, like demand conditions, are only controlled for to the extent that
the control variables account for them.
CRF’s for firms in the lower and upper quintile of the FEi distribution are graphed in Figure
14. The response functions are qualitatively similar to those estimated for the previous definition of
high and low priced markets. Low price markets react faster to positive cost shocks over the first five
days following the cost change; however, the difference in the speed of adjustment is not statistically
significant. High and low price markets react almost identically to negative cost changes, and thus,
there is no meaningful difference in the magnitude of price asymmetry between high and low priced
markets. Neither of the definitions, therefore, find a connection between price levels and asymmetric
pricing, which contradicts hypothesis 4 and focal price collusion as the motivator of rockets and
feathers.50
7 Conclusion
In this paper, I identify the existence of rockets and feathers in the retail gasoline industry, but
more importantly, provide sound evidence in support of consumer search costs as the underlying
cause. By examining the markup of premium over regular fuel, I find that individual firms price
premium gasoline with more asymmetry than regular, and the increased asymmetry is entirely a
result of premium prices falling slower. As premium consumers are typified by greater search costs,
this result supports the theories presented in Tappata (2009) and Yang and Ye (2008). Moreover,
the relationship between measures of price dispersion (which serve as a proxy for the incentive to
search) and rockets and feathers is consistent with search-based theory.
Conversely, I find little evidence in favor of focal price collusion as a consequential determinant of
asymmetric pricing. Even though monopolies price symmetrically (which is also in accordance with
search theory) there is no connection between price levels and asymmetry. In addition, firms with
the highest probability of being engaged in a collusive agreement price with no more asymmetry
than firms that almost certainly are not colluding. Given that there exists no formal theory of
focal price collusion that produces asymmetric pricing, and that I find no evidence in favor of the
informal hypothesis, there is no reason to suspect that collusion is a relevant factor.
The richness of data used throughout the empirical investigation affords the opportunity to
generalize results. The data set includes daily price observations for over 11,000 stations located in
the east and west coasts, and in both rural and urban areas. The unique data set also provides a
solid foundation for future research. Incorporating firm specific traits and commuter patterns into
50Testing of the connection between firm cooperation and asymmetry further undermines collusion as the cause
of rockets and feathers. Pairs of firms within .1 miles who often undercut each other price with the same degree of
asymmetry as pairs of firms that generally cooperate. Focal price collusion, however, contains periods of price war,
and therefore, the theoretical distinction between the types of firms is not entirely clear.
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the investigation may paint a clearer picture of asymmetric pricing. US Census data details the
driving behavior of cities’ population, which may correlate with the propensity to search for the
best price. Exploiting this information will facilitate a closer analysis of search-based asymmetric
pricing theory.
Additionally, the propensity for collusion amongst closely located firms warrants a closer look.
In this study, I illustrate that colluding on the previous period’s price is not the mechanism behind
asymmetric pricing. This is not to say, however, that collusion is absent from the retail gasoline
industry; it only shows that the chosen method of collusion does not generate asymmetric pricing.
If, for example, firms agree upon an artificially high markup over wholesale costs then retail prices
will adjust symmetrically to cost shocks. More generally addressing the issue of collusion, perhaps
by analyzing instances of price wars, offers an avenue for future research. Finally, the data set offers
a unique opportunity to address periods of large cost changes. More closely examining which firms
led the rundown of retail prices during the financial crisis, or how firms behavior differs during very
high and low cost periods may identify some interesting properties of oligopolies.
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8 Appendix
In the appendix I demonstrate that this paper’s econometric procedure produces more accurate
results than the one utilized in Borenstein et al. (1997), and that studies of asymmetric pricing
that do not employ daily price data may produce spurious results. Geweke (1978) details the various
channels through which temporal aggregation may contaminate parameter estimates. Of particular
interest to this study is Geweke’s finding that the potential for temporally aggregated data to bias
estimates is increasing in the correlation between explanatory variables. As lagged retail prices
and costs are almost perfectly correlated in the data, it follows that any temporal aggregation may
seriously limit the ability to accurately measure asymmetric pricing. To gauge the degree to which
previous studies may have suffered from temporally aggregated data, I follow the advice of Geweke
(1978) and estimate models at various levels of data aggregation and compare the results. I estimate
the model specifications using the regular unleaded price data set aggregated to average city-week
levels (similar to BCG), refined to station-week average prices (as in Hosken et al. (2008)), then
specified as daily city averages, and finally completely disaggregated to station-specific daily prices.
Each data specification is tested using three different models: the standard-error correction model
employed in the body of the paper, an error-correction model (equation (6)) where the long and
short-run components are estimated simultaneously, and equation (6) estimated via two-staged least
squares regression as in BCG. It turns out that the BCG framework systematically produces biased
results and yields highly implausible estimates when used in conjunction with station-level daily
price data. These results are consistent with Bachmeier and Griffin (2003) in that the two-step
technique appears to perform with greatest accuracy when used in tandem with the best available
data. However, the estimates oppose Bachmeier and Griffin (2003) in that strong evidence in favor
of the rockets and feathers phenomenon is produced. That is, even after implementing the technique
the previous study used to reject asymmetric pricing I find that when it is employed along with
daily price data rockets and feathers pricing exists. The analysis also shows that BCG’s econometric
technique performs poorly not because of their decision to estimate the error-correction model in a
single step, as posited in Bachmeier et al. (2003), but as a result of their reliance upon instrumental
variable regression.
To begin, the data is aggregated to city-week averages.51 Figure 15 graphs daily retail and
wholesale prices for a single gas station in Washington, DC, and Figure 16 graphs weekly average
retail and wholesale prices for the entire city. In comparing the two graphs, the volume of informa-
tion lost by aggregating almost 100 hundred gas station daily prices into weekly averages becomes
apparent. Figure 15 clearly illustrates the daily comovements of price and cost, which become
severely muted when averaged over time and geographic region. Estimates of asymmetric pricing
51All cities with a population of less than 25,000 are dropped for the city-week portion of the analysis.
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may, therefore, suffer from the problems detailed in Geweke (1978, 2004).
To increase the accuracy of the results, I add city fixed effects to equation (2), and the log of
population and the number and percentage of non-major branded stations in each city to equations
(6) and (7). BCG proposes estimating equation (6) using two-stage least squares regression to
control for the possible endogeneity of Cit, which could arise if city-specific demand shocks affected
the wholesale cost of gasoline. As such, a set of instruments akin to those used by BCG is identified:
lagged changes in the Brent crude oil spot price (the primary index for crude prices in Europe) and
in Singapore conventional gasoline prices. The Brent crude oil price is an appropriate instrument,
as it is determined on the world market and highly correlated with wholesale gasoline costs for the
retail stations included in the data set. It is highly unlikely, however, that any local demand shocks
for retail gasoline in the United States would affect the spot price of oil in Europe. The spot price
of gasoline in Singapore is similarly correlated with the wholesale price of gasoline in the United
States, as both are derived from the globally determined price of crude oil; yet, any unobserved
local shocks to demand in the data set will have no effect on the price of gasoline in Singapore.
The results of three separate regressions are reported in Table 6; column 1 utilizes two-step
estimation of equation (7), and columns 2 and 3 employ OLS and 2SLS, respectively, of equation
(6).52 The respective CRF’s are depicted in Figure 17, and it appears that none of the estimation
techniques are robust to the temporal aggregation problem. Particularly problematic is that BCG’s
IV method implies that one week following a cost increase retail prices increase by only 5% of the
size of the initial shock, but incorporate 22% of a negative cost shock into final retail prices. BCG’s
estimation technique, therefore, predicts that retail gasoline prices are almost entirely sticky for
a week following a positive cost shock. Given that firms in this market have a menu cost close
to zero, this result seems wholly unrealistic. Moreover, BCG’s IV method predicts asymmetric
pricing in the opposite direction: prices react more quickly to negative than positive cost shocks.
And, while the one and two step models do not predict complete upward price stickiness, they
estimate retail prices to increase by 16% and 18%, respectively, of the size of the cost shock, their
estimates are unrealistically low. The two-step and BCG OLS models do not perform as poorly
as the IV model, however, both fail to identify asymmetric pricing at the 95% confidence level.
The seemingly unrealistic estimates produced by all three models may be a consequence of the
particularly volatile price of oil over the time period I collected data. According to Geweke’s
theory, daily volatility in independent variables increases the probability that weekly averaged data
will contaminate estimates. Thus, aside from the peculiar result of upward price stickiness, there
exists a theoretical basis upon which to view these results with skepticism.
In order to glean the extent to which the atypical results are a consequence of temporal aggre-
52All standard errors are clustered by city and are robust to heteroscedasticity. The lag lengths for past retail and
cost changes is set to five.
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gation versus averaging prices across firms, I first disaggregate the data to the station level, but
leave prices as weekly averages. A share of the recent rockets and feathers literature employs this
type of data; Eckert (2002) and Hosken et al. (2008) are prime examples. To improve the accuracy
of the estimates, equations (6) and (7) are augmented with the same characteristic data as in the
body of the paper.
Estimated coefficients and standard errors clustered by station and corrected for heteroscedas-
ticity are reported in Table 7. The parameters are again measured with a high degree of power, and
nearly every coefficient is significant at the 99% confidence level. In fact, the results are strikingly
similar to those reported for city averages, suggesting that temporal aggregation poses a greater
problem in the estimation of retail gasoline market dynamics than does averaging prices across firms.
BCG’s IV method still predicts retail prices reacting in greater magnitude to negative cost changes,
and the BCG OLS model finds no price asymmetry. The two-step model, however, finds evidence
of rockets and feathers for just over 3.5 weeks following an initial cost change. Still, all three models
predict almost the same degree of upward price stickiness as with city-week averaged data. Thus,
the concerns of Geweke (1978, 2004) hold true; employing weekly data in regressions when variables
change on a daily basis can severely bias parameter estimates, especially when multiple right-hand
side variables are highly correlated.
The troubles of temporal aggregation are underscored when each of the three models are esti-
mated using city-averaged daily price data.53 Even though prices are still spatially aggregated the
estimates dramatically improve, and both the one and two-step models produce results resembling
those found in section 4. Estimates are reported in Table 8 and plotted in Figure 19, and it is clear
that prices respond more quickly to price increases than decreases. The upward price stickiness
that pervaded the temporally aggregated estimates has completely disappeared from the one and
two-step models; one week following a positive cost shock both models find that nearly half of the
cost increase has been incorporated into the final price. Yet, this is not true for negative cost shocks
as both models detect price asymmetry for more than 6 days after the initial cost change.54 Despite
the improvement in both the one and two-step error-correction models the IV estimation utilized in
BCG does not fair any better,55 and in some respects the parameter estimates have become more
implausible. Retail prices are predicted to decrease by 13% of the size of the shock immediately
following a cost increase and increase by 8% of the shock immediately after a cost decrease. This
spurious finding is a direct consequence of using instrumental variable regression. Although the
instruments are similar to those used in BCG,56 the Hansen J statistic rejects their validity with
53I use the same additional controls in these regressions as with the city-week averaged data, but also include day
of the week dummies.
54This is true at the 95% confidence level.
55When using daily data I instrument for concurrent positive and negative cost changes, ∆C+t−1 and ∆C
−
t−1.
56Both this study and BCG utilize the Brent crude oil price as an instrument. However, where they use oil futures
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more than 99% confidence. Thus, there is strong reason to believe the estimated equation is mis-
specified when using IV regression, which helps to explain the nonsensical results. Of further note
is the near statistically identical performance of both OLS methods. This suggests that it is not
BCG’s decision to simultaneously estimate long and short-run price responses, but their reliance on
IV regression that biases estimates.
Refining the daily data to the station level confirms that it is IV regression that contaminates
BCG’s econometric technique. Using this data, I estimate the same equations as with the weekly
station level data, but add additional controls for the day of week. Both Foros and Steen (2008) and
Eckert and West (2004) find that the day of the week is an important determinant of retail gasoline
prices. For one, demand is greater on weekdays when many people commute to work. Furthermore,
certain days of the week may serve as focal points for coordinated price increases. It is these market
dynamics that are lost when data is aggregated to the weekly level, and this loss is confirmed by
every day of the week dummy being significant at the 99% confidence level in each of the subsequent
regressions. Table 9 reports estimates of the three models, and the corresponding CRF’s are charted
in Figure 20. The results differ markedly from both sets of weekly averaged regressions, but are
nearly identical to the daily city estimates. The IV model again predicts that retail prices decrease
the first day after a positive cost shock and increase following a negative shock.57 Bachmeier and
Griffin (2003) discuss the potential bias and unclear convergence properties associated with BCG’s
IV method. Additionally, note that any motivation BCG may have had for employing instrumental
variables seems unfounded when estimating their model with daily station level prices and NYMEX
commodity prices as a measure of cost. Their concern was that demand shocks affecting the largest
US cities may influence the terminal price of gasoline in those respective cities. However, since I
use the wholesale prices listed on the New York Mercantile Exchange as a proxy for cost there is
no reason to believe that any local demand shocks influence this price over the span of the data.
Thus, nothing is gained by including the instrumental variables.
In contrast to the problems with the IV model, both OLS models generate parameters that
drastically improve upon the implausible results of their temporally aggregated counterparts. They
estimate a smooth pass through of positive cost shocks; 10 days after a 1¢ increase in wholesale
cost retail prices increase by .6¢. Moreover, both econometric techniques yield strong evidence in
favor of rockets and feathers; for more than 8 days following a cost shock the cumulative retail price
response to a positive shock is greater than to a negative shock.58 Both models predict that ten
days after the initial one cent cost change consumers lose about 1.3¢ more from an increase than
they gain from a decrease, and the difference is significantly different from zero with 99% confidence
prices as additional instruments I employ the spot price of wholesale gasoline traded at the Singapore harbor.
57The Hansen J statistic again rejects the validity of the instruments with more than 99% confidence.
58This is true with 95% confidence.
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in both OLS models.
The contrast in predictions across levels of data aggregation and econometric models warrants
a closer analysis. The difference in results as the data progresses from station level weekly averaged
prices to daily prices may partially be attributed to the short time span over which I possess data.
Yet, this alone cannot explain the schism; even when prices are analyzed as weekly averages there
is still 52 weeks of data for over 11,000 stations. In fact, the high power with which coefficients are
estimated, almost every parameter is significant with 99% confidence, suggests that the estimates
do not suffer for lack of power. The uniquely volatile price of oil over the time I collected data
certainly accentuates the bias of the weekly averaged analysis. Aside from the first Gulf War
period, the time over which BCG test for retail price asymmetry contained relatively stable wholesale
costs; prices rarely fluctuated more than a cent each day. Conversely, the recent bubble in the oil
market and subsequent bursting has translated into a particularly volatile time for the price of
gasoline. As such, the problems associated with temporal aggregation detailed in Geweke (1978)
have become exaggerated. When prices are relatively stable, and the econometrician possesses
data over a long frame of time, weekly averaged prices may not serve as a poor approximation of
daily prices. Yet, when costs change by a large magnitude on a daily basis important dynamics
are muted by temporally aggregating prices. And, it is precisely the loss of daily dynamics which
augments the potential biases that arise in temporally aggregated models. Another source of the
large bias associated with the weekly averaged models is the almost perfect correlation between
lagged prices and wholesale costs: both explanatory variables. As previously noted, the potential for
contaminated estimates in temporally aggregated models is increasing in the degree of correlation
between right-hand side variables. Lagged changes in cost and retail price are almost perfectly
correlated in the data, and should be in any study of the retail gasoline industry. Thus, it is not
surprising that estimating models with daily data produces results unique from the temporally
aggregated estimations. Another interesting point is how little is gained by moving from city to
firm level data. The results are qualitatively identical for city and station level estimates at the
weekly averaged and daily level, respectively. Consequently, spatially aggregated prices may serve
just as well as firm specific prices when testing for rockets and feathers – provided the data contains
daily price observations. Unfortunately, the econometrician may gain almost nothing by possessing
firm specific over city-wide data if prices are weekly averages, as the ills of time averaged data may
not be overcome by observing prices at the firm instead of city level.
The use of IV regression appears to accentuate the contamination seen in the first two regressions,
and still produces unrealistic results when employed with daily data. However, if one period lagged
costs are excluded from the estimated equation the IV model produces estimates similar to both
OLS models. Yet, these are precisely the instrumented variables. Given the small probability of
endogeneity and the poor performance of IV regression in previous studies of asymmetric pricing,
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there is no convincing argument in favor of using this technique when investigating rockets and
feathers in the retail gasoline industry.59 Also, note the nearly identical performance of the one
and two-step methods, especially when analyzing daily data. Bachmeier and Griffin (2003) are
particularly skeptical of estimating long and short-run price responses in a single equation, and do
provide evidence that it can bias results. Additionally, Engle and Granger (1987) originally proposed
a two-step estimation procedure when they derived the error-correction method of controlling for
cointegration. Therefore, I advocate erring on the side of caution and employing a two-step OLS
analysis of asymmetric pricing. Finally, I recommend cautiously interpreting any study of the retail
gasoline industry that utilizes weekly price data, either at the city or station-level, as temporal
aggregation may seriously contaminate results.
59Even BCG note that they gain almost nothing over traditional OLS by using the instrumental variable approach.
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9 Tables
Table 1: Summary of Previous Literature
Paper Model Data Asymmetry Result
Bacon (1991) Quadratic Adjustment City, bi-weekly average Existence
Borenstein et al. (1997) IV Error-Correction City, semi-monthly average Existence
Godby et al. (2000) Threshold Regression City average, weekly Non-existence
Eckert (2002) Error-Correction City, weekly average Existence
Galeotti et al. (2003) Error-Correction Country, monthly average Non-existence
Lewis (2005) Error-Correction Station, weekly Non-existence
Deltas (2008) Error-Correction State, monthly Existence
Hosken et al. (2008) Error-Correction City, weekly average Existence
Verlinda (2008) Error-Correction Station, weekly Existence
Notes: These studies represent important works in the “Rockets and Feathers” literature, but are only a sample.
For a more complete literature review and nice overview of the different econometric models see Geweke (2004).
Table 2: Summary Statistics
Regular Price Premium Price Wholesale Cost
Mean 201.54 227.18 173.08
Std. Dev. 68.77 68.8 62.82
# Increases 156 153 166
Avg. Increase Size .98 .99 3.62
# Decrease 208 211 198
Avg Decrease Size -1.42 -1.41 -3.67
Notes: The sample includes price observations from 7/30/08 - 7/29/09 for over 11,000 gas stations, and the units
are US ¢. The price observations were scraped daily from gasprices.mapquest.com, whose data is provided by the Oil
Price Information Service (OPIS), for all gas stations in the states of NJ, VA, MD, WA and the cities of Philadelphia,
PA and Washington, DC. Cost data is a daily weighted-average of the closing spot price of reformulated gasoline
shipped from the Los Angeles, CA and NY, NY harbors; the weights used to average the cost data reflect the
proportion of gas stations in the data set located in the west or east coast of the United States.
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Table 3: Summary Statistics and Results of Regressing Retail Price on Characteristic and Day of
Week Controls.
Mean Std. Dev. Coef. T-stat
Miles to closest competitor 0.65 1.29 .87 21.56
# firms ≤ .1 miles 0.34 0.63 0.05 0.48
# firms > .1 miles and ≤ 1.5 miles 6.32 5.26 -0.01 0.22
# firms > 1.5 miles and ≤ 5 miles 41.51 38.20 0.003 3.05
Independent brand indicator 0.34 0.47 -8.16 -86.89
% independent competitors < 0.1 miles 0.31 0.44 -3.48 -18.25
% independent competitors < 0.1 miles and ≤ 1.5 miles 0.35 0.27 -7.33 -41.76
% independent competitors < 1.5 miles and ≤ 5 miles 0.34 0.20 -11.42 -48.64
Log of population 10.26 1.91 0.43 17.23
Log of median income 10.64 0.34 4.87 32.93
Notes: Regressions are performed at the daily-firm level. Each row represents a unique regression of price on the
specified characteristic and day of the week controls. Before regressing retail price on station characteristics all taxes
are removed. For the statistic % independent competitors ≤ .1 miles, only stations with at least one competitor
within .1 miles are considered. This analogously holds for the subsequent two statistics. Population measures are
either the 2007 projections by the United States Census Bureau, or the 2000 census measure when the projections
are unavailable. Median income data is from the 2000 US census.
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Table 4: Asymmetric Response Individual Station Daily Prices
Coef. Estimate Coef. Estimate
∆C+t−1 0.08*** ∆R
+
t−2 -0.35***
(0.00) (0.01)
∆C+t−2 0.07*** ∆R
+
t−3 -0.07***
(0.00) (0.01)
∆C+t−3 0.04*** ∆R
+
t−4 -0.01
(0.00) (0.01)
∆C+t−4 0.02*** ∆R
+
t−5 0.01**
(0.00) (0.00)
∆C+t−5 0.03*** ∆R
−
t−2 -0.17***
(0.00) (0.01)
∆C−t−1 -0.00* ∆R
−
t−3 -0.06***
(0.00) (0.00)
∆C−t−2 -0.05*** ∆R
−
t−4 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
∆C−t−3 -0.00 ∆R
−
t−5 0.03***
(0.00) (0.00)
∆C−t−4 0.01*** ϑ
+
1 -0.07***
(0.00) (0.00)
∆C−t−5 -0.01*** ϑ
−
1 -0.08***
(0.00) (0.00)
Observations 609,992
Notes: The dependent variable is the current period change in the price of regular unleaded fuel. ∆C+t−n and
∆C−t−n are estimates of the parameters on positive and negative cost changes, respectively, of lag length n, ∆R
+
t−n
and ∆R−t−n are estimates of lagged retail price changes, and ϑ
+
1 and ϑ
−
1 are parameter estimates of the error-correction
term. The model was estimated for lag length n = 10, but all estimates are not reported due to lack of space. Also
unreported are estimates of the parameters for market characteristic control variables: log of population, the number
of competitors within .1 miles, between .1 and 1.5 miles, and between 1.5 and 5 miles, the distance of the closest
competitor, the percentage of unbranded stations within .1, between .1 and 1.5 miles, and between 1.5 and 5 miles,
and day of the week dummies. All unreported estimates are available upon request. The CRF’s constructed from
the estimates are graphed in Figure 3. Standard errors are listed in parenthesis below the estimate, clustered by
station, and robust to heteroscedasticity. Significant at 1% = ***, significant at 5% = **, significant at 5% = *.
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Table 5: Market Level Asymmetric Response
Premium Regular Premium - Regular
∆C+t−1 0.03*** 0.07*** 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
∆C+t−2 0.02*** 0.10*** 0.03***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
∆C+t−3 0.03*** 0.05*** 0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
∆C−t−1 -0.04*** -0.01*** -0.08***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
∆C−t−2 -0.11*** -0.04*** -0.05***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
∆C−t−3 -0.08*** 0.01*** -0.09***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
∆R+t−2 -0.57*** -0.20*** -0.68***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
∆R+t−3 -0.33*** 0.01 -0.56***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
∆R−t−2 -0.50*** -0.21*** -0.65***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
∆R−t−3 -0.30*** -0.01 -0.54***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
ϑ+1 -0.13*** -0.05*** -0.20***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ϑ−1 -0.13*** -0.06*** -0.18***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Observations 536,584 536,584 503,913
Cost Wholesale Spot Wholesale Spot Crude Oil Spot
Notes: The market average price variables used in the three separate regressions are stated in the first row. Premium
- Regular is the average market markup of premium over regular gasoline. ∆C+t−n and ∆C
−
t−n are estimates of the
parameters on positive and negative cost changes, respectively, of lag length n, ∆R+t−n and ∆R
−
t−n are estimates of
lagged retail price changes, and ϑ+1 and ϑ
−
1 are parameter estimates of the error-correction term. The model was
estimated for lag length n = 10, but all estimates are not reported due to lack of space. Also unreported are estimates
of the parameters for market characteristic control variables: the number of competitors and the percentage of those
who are unbranded in the market and between 1.5 and 5 miles of the market center, the log of population of the
market, and day of the week controls. Unreported estimates are available upon request. CRF’s constructed from
columns one and two are plotted in Figure 6 and the CRF corresponding to column three is in Figure 7. Standard
errors are listed in parenthesis below the estimate, clustered by market, and robust to heteroscedasticity. Significant
at 1% = ***, significant at 5% = **, significant at 5% = *.
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Table 6: Asymmetric Response City-Week Averages
Model
Two-Step BCG OLS BCG IV
∆C+t−1 0.18*** 0.16*** 0.05***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
∆C+t−2 0.21*** 0.19*** 0.17***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
∆C+t−3 0.01 -0.01 -0.02*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
∆C−t−1 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.22***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
∆C−t−2 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.07***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
∆C−t−3 0.01 0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
∆R+t−2 0.23*** 0.22*** 0.23***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
∆R+t−3 0.04** 0.04** 0.04**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
∆R−t−2 0.33*** 0.34*** 0.34***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
∆R−t−3 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.17***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Rt−1 -0.18*** -0.19***
(0.01) (0.01)
Ct−1 0.18*** 0.20***
(0.01) (0.01)
ϑ+1 -0.20***
(0.01)
ϑ−1 -0.14***
(0.01)
Observations 9,394 9,394 9,394
Notes: The city-week average change in regular fuel price is the dependent variable. Column 1 reports estimates
of equation (7) using the two-step method employed in section 4, Column 2 reports OLS estimation of equation (6),
and column 3 is IV estimation of equation (6). All cities with a population less than 25,000 are dropped. ∆C+t−n and
∆C−t−n are estimates of the parameters on positive and negative cost changes, respectively, of lag length n, ∆R
+
t−n
and ∆R−t−n are estimates of lagged retail price changes, Rt−1 and Ct−1 are lagged price and cost levels, and ϑ
+
1 and
ϑ−1 are parameter estimates of the error-correction term. Each model was estimated for lag length n = 5, but all
estimates are not reported due to lack of space. Corresponding CRF’s are plotted in Figure 17. Standard errors are
listed in parenthesis below the estimate, clustered by city, and robust to heteroscedasticity. Significant at 1% = ***,
significant at 5% = **, significant at 5% = *.
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Table 7: Asymmetric Response Individual Station Weekly Averages
Model
Two-Step BCG OLS BCG IV
∆C+t−1 0.17*** 0.15*** 0.04***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
∆C+t−2 0.21*** 0.17*** 0.13***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
∆C+t−3 0.05*** 0.03*** -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
∆C−t−1 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.29***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
∆C−t−2 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.07***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
∆C−t−3 0.03*** 0.02*** -0.01***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
∆R+t−2 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.11***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
∆R+t−3 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.06***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
∆R−t−2 0.16*** 0.17*** 0.17***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
∆R−t−3 0.15*** 0.16*** 0.18***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Rt−1 -0.23*** -0.24***
(0.00) (0.00)
Ct−1 0.24*** 0.25***
(0.00) (0.00)
ϑ+1 -0.27***
(0.00)
ϑ−1 -0.17***
(0.00)
Observations 373,205 373,205 373,205
Notes: Firm weekly-average changes in regular fuel price is the dependent variable. Column 1 reports estimates of
equation (7) using the two-step method employed in section 4, Column 2 reports OLS estimation of equation (6),
and column 3 is IV estimation of equation (6). ∆C+t−n and ∆C
−
t−n are estimates of the parameters on positive and
negative cost changes, respectively, of lag length n, ∆R+t−n and ∆R
−
t−n are estimates of lagged retail price changes,
Rt−1 and Ct−1 are lagged price and cost levels, and ϑ+1 and ϑ
−
1 are parameter estimates of the error-correction term.
Each model was estimated for lag length n = 5, but all estimates are not reported due to lack of space. Corresponding
CRF’s are plotted in Figure 18. Standard errors are listed in parenthesis below the estimate, clustered by station,
and robust to heteroscedasticity. Significant at 1% = ***, significant at 5% = **, significant at 5% = *.
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Table 8: Asymmetric Response Daily City Prices
Model
Two-Step BCG OLS BCG IV
∆C+t−1 0.05*** 0.05*** -0.13***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
∆C+t−2 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.09***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
∆C+t−3 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.05***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
∆C−t−1 0.00 -0.00 0.08***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
∆C−t−2 -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.04***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
∆C−t−3 0.01*** 0.01* -0.01**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
∆R+t−2 -0.28*** -0.28*** -0.28***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
∆R+t−3 -0.04** -0.04** -0.04**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
∆R−t−2 -0.26*** -0.26*** -0.26***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
∆R−t−3 -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Rt−1 -0.05*** -0.05***
(0.00) (0.00)
Ct−1 0.05*** 0.05***
(0.00) (0.00)
ϑ+1 -0.04***
(0.00)
ϑ−1 -0.06***
(0.00)
Observations 65,982 65,982 65,982
Notes: The city averaged daily changes in regular fuel price is the dependent variable. Column 1 reports estimates
of equation (7) using the two-step method employed in section 4, Column 2 reports OLS estimation of equation (6),
and column 3 is IV estimation of equation (6). All cities with a population less than 25,000 are dropped. ∆C+t−n and
∆C−t−n are estimates of the parameters on positive and negative cost changes, respectively, of lag length n, ∆R
+
t−n
and ∆R−t−n are estimates of lagged retail price changes, Rt−1 and Ct−1 are lagged price and cost levels, and ϑ
+
1 and
ϑ−1 are parameter estimates of the error-correction term. Each model was estimated for lag length n = 10, but all
estimates are not reported due to lack of space. Corresponding CRF’s are plotted in Figure 19. Standard errors are
listed in parenthesis below the estimate, clustered by city, and robust to heteroscedasticity. Significant at 1% = ***,
significant at 5% = **, significant at 5% = *.
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Table 9: Asymmetric Response Individual Station Daily Prices
Model
Two-Step BCG OLS BCG IV
∆C+t−1 0.08*** 0.08*** -0.16***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
∆C+t−2 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.10***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
∆C+t−3 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.05***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
∆C−t−1 -0.00* -0.01*** 0.10***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
∆C−t−2 -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.07***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
∆C−t−3 -0.00 -0.01*** -0.05***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
∆R+t−2 -0.35*** -0.34*** -0.35***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
∆R+t−3 -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.07***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
∆R−t−2 -0.17*** -0.17*** -0.17***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
∆R−t−3 -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.05***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Rt−1 -0.08*** -0.08***
(0.00) (0.00)
Ct−1 0.08*** 0.08***
(0.00) (0.00)
ϑ+1 -0.07***
(0.00)
ϑ−1 -0.08***
(0.00)
Observations 609,992 609,992 609,992
Notes: Firm daily changes in regular fuel price is the dependent variable. Column 1 reports estimates of equation
(7) using the two-step method employed in section 4, Column 2 reports OLS estimation of equation (6), and column
3 is IV estimation of equation (6). ∆C+t−n and ∆C
−
t−n are estimates of the parameters on positive and negative
cost changes, respectively, of lag length n, ∆R+t−n and ∆R
−
t−n are estimates of lagged retail price changes, Rt−1 and
Ct−1 are lagged price and cost levels, and ϑ+1 and ϑ
−
1 are parameter estimates of the error-correction term. Each
model was estimated for lag length n = 10, but all estimates are not reported due to lack of space. Corresponding
CRF’s are plotted in Figure 20. Standard errors are listed in parenthesis below the estimate, clustered by station,
and robust to heteroscedasticity. Significant at 1% = ***, significant at 5% = **, significant at 5% = *.
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10 Figures
Figure 1
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Average Daily Prices: 7/30/08−7/29/09
 
 
Retail Regular Fuel (Before Tax)
Wholesale
Notes: Retail price is the daily average price for regular unleaded fuel for all firms in the data set. Wholesale is a
daily weighted-average of the closing spot price of reformulated gasoline shipped from the Los Angeles, CA and NY,
NY Harbors; the weights used to average the cost data reflect the proportion of gas stations in the data set located
in the west or east coast of the United States.
Figure 2: Screen Shot: Baltimore, MD
Notes: This figure is a screen shot of gasprices.mapquest.com. The picture shows a map of Baltimore, MD and the
location of the ten gas stations closest to the city’s center.
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Notes: CRF’s are constructed from the parameters estimated in Table 4. The positive (negative) cumulative
response function measures, on each day, the proportion of a one unit positive (negative) cost shock at t = 0 that
has been incorporated into a firm’s retail price.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
Days After Shock
C u
m
u l
a t
i v e
 W
e l
f a
r e
 D
i f f
e r
e n
c e
Cumulative Adjustment Asymmetry
 
 
Asymmetry
95% CI
95% CI
Notes: Parameters from Table 4 are used to estimate equation (9), which measure, on each day, the cumulative
speed of adjustment to a positive shock minus the adjustment to a negative shock. The estimated function being
greater than zero evidences asymmetric pricing.
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Figure 5
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Predicted Retail Prices: Asymmetric and Symmetric Responses
 
 
Asymmetric Retail Prices
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Wholesale Spot Prices
Notes: Retail price predictions are regular octane fuel pre-tax estimates. Asymmetric prices are predicted using parameter estimates
of equation (7) for lag length n=10. Symmetric prices are predicted using parameter estimates of equation (7), but the lagged negative
changes in cost parameters, C−t−n, are replaced with the estimates for positive cost changes, C
+
t−n, and the estimate of ϑ
+
1 , the effect
of retail prices being above its long-run relationship with cost, is replaced with ϑ−1 , the effect of retail prices being below its long-run
relationship with cost.
Figure 6
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
Days After Shock
C u
m
u l
a t
i v e
 P
r o
p o
r t i
o n
a l
 R
e s
p o
n s
e
Market Asymmetry: Regular and Premium
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Notes: Parameters from column 1 and column 2 of Table 5 are used to estimated the CRF’s for market average premium and regular
gasoline prices, respectively. Both price series exhibit price asymmetry with more than 95% confidence.
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Figure 7
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Cumulative Response Functions:  Premium Markup Over Regular
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data3
Notes: Parameters from column 3 of Table 5 are used to estimate the CRF’s, which track the response of the markup
of premium over regular gasoline to positive and negative cost shocks. The markup has a negative proportional
response to a negative shock (meaning the gap increases), and has a response close to zero to a positive shock.
Figure 8
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Cumulative Response Functions: Sorted by Average Market Price Range
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Notes: CRF’s are estimated for markets with an average price range in the lower or upper quintile of average price
range distribution. Markets with a low average price range exhibit more price asymmetry (1.1¢ cumulative difference
ten days after a one cent cost shock) with 95% confidence level.
48
Figure 9
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Cumulative Response Functions: Low and High Variance
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Notes: CRF’s are estimated for markets with an average price variance in the lower or upper quintile of the average
price variance distribution. Markets with a high average price variance have less price asymmetry at the 95%
confidence level.
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Notes: This figure plots the distribution of the “closest competitor” variable, which for each firm gives the distance,
in miles, of the nearest rival.
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−
Notes: This plots the estimate of equation (9), which measures, on each day, the cumulative speed of adjustment
to a positive shock minus the adjustment to a negative shock, for firms whose closest competitor is at least 2.2 miles
away. These firms, which have a substantial degree of monopoly power, show no price asymmetry.
Figure 12
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Notes: This plots the estimate of equation (9) for firms whose closest competitor is no more than .013 miles away.
With 95% confidence these firms price asymmetrically for up to 4 days following a cost shock.
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Figure 13
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Cumulative Response Functions:  High and Low Priced Firms
 
 
Pos. Low Price
Neg. Low Price
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Neg. High Price
Notes: CRF’s are graphed for pairs of firms within .1 miles that generally price above or below their market’s
average price (“high” and “low”, respectively, are defined on page 23.). Throughout the course of adjustment there
is no statistically significant distinction in the degree of asymmetry of the two groups.
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Cumulative Response Functions:  High and Low Fixed Effects
 
 
Pos. Low FE
Neg. Low FE
Pos. High FE
Neg. High FE
Notes: CRF’s are estimated for markets whose average price is in the top or lower quintile of the average market price
distribution (“High FE” and “Low FE”, respectively). Throughout the course of adjustment there is no statistically
significant distinction in the degree of asymmetry of the two groups.
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Figure 15
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Notes: The retail regular unleaded price and wholesale cost for a single gas station in Washington, DC is depicted
in this figure. The NYMEX spot price for reformulated regular gasoline delivered from the NY Harbor is used as
the wholesale cost measure.
Figure 16
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Notes: The daily average retail regular unleaded gasoline price for the city of Washington, DC is graphed along
with the wholesale cost. The NYMEX spot price for reformulated regular gasoline delivered from the NY Harbor is
used as the wholesale cost measure.
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Cumulative Response Functions:  City−Week Average
 
 
Pos. OLS BCG
Neg. OLS BCG
Pos. Two−Step
Neg. Two−Step
Pos. IV BCG
Neg. IV BCG
Notes: CRF’s are constructed from parameter estimates listed in Table 6 for columns 1 (Two-Step), 2 (OLS BCG), and 3 (IV BCG).
“Two-Step” refers to estimating equation (2) using OLS then plugging parameters into equation (7), which is again estimated with OLS;
“OLS BCG” is OLS estimation of equation (6); IV BCG is instrumental variable regression of equation (7). Data is weekly averaged for
all cities with a population greater than 25,000.
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Cumulative Response Functions:  Station−Week Average
 
 
Pos. OLS BCG
Neg. OLS BCG
Pos. Two−Step
Neg. Two−Step
Pos. IV BCG
Neg. IV BCG
Notes: CRF’s are constructed from parameter estimates listed in Table 6 for columns 1 (Two-Step), 2 (OLS BCG), and 3 (IV BCG).
“Two-Step” refers to estimating equation (2) using OLS then plugging parameters into equation (7) which is again estimated with OLS;
“OLS BCG” is OLS estimation of equation (6); IV BCG is instrumental variable regression of equation (7). Data is weekly averages for
individual stations.
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Figure 19
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Cumulative Response Functions:  City−Day Average
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Notes: CRF’s are constructed from parameter estimates listed in Table 6 for columns 1 (Two-Step), 2 (OLS BCG), and 3 (IV BCG).
“Two-Step” refers to estimating equation (2) using OLS then plugging parameters into equation (7) which is again estimated with OLS;
“OLS BCG” is OLS estimation of equation (6); IV BCG is instrumental variable regression of equation (7). Data is daily averages for
all cities with a population greater than 25,000.
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Cumulative Response Functions:  Station−Daily
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Neg. Two−Step
Pos. IV BCG
Neg. IV BCG
Notes: CRF’s are constructed from parameter estimates listed in Table 6 for columns 1 (Two-Step), 2 (OLS BCG), and 3 (IV BCG).
“Two-Step” refers to estimating equation (2) using OLS then plugging parameters into equation (7) which is again estimated with OLS;
“OLS BCG” is OLS estimation of equation (6); IV BCG is instrumental variable regression of equation (7). Data is daily observations
for individual stations.
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